TNAG-2022-FCO40-2884-Chinese-use-of-force-in-respect-of-Hong-Kong-1990 — Page 38

SECRET UK EYES A

From: M L Howard, Secretariat (Overseas) (Commitments)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Main Building Whitehall London SW1A 2HB

Telephone: (Direct Dialling) 01-218 6272

(Switchboard) 01-218 9000

M V Stone

FCO/Hong Kong Department

WH 312

Decar Michel,

CHINESE USE OF FORCE AGAINST HONG KONG

Your reference

Our reference

D/Sec (0) (C)/6/7

Date

26 January 1990

нев огоlis

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY

19 MAR 1990

DESK OFFICER

INDEX

НА

REGISTRY !

Action Taken

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You asked about our contingency plans against a possible Chinese use of force in Hong Kong, following an enquiry by your Minister.

HMG's political response would, of course, be

I

a matter for the FCO, so I will cover the military aspects. have further confined this to consideration of military assets in Hong Kong or earmarked for its reinforcement. In the event of major aggression against a British colony, it would of course be open to the Government to deploy the full range of military options available to it in response.

The military threat

2.

Some 40,000 PLA troops (one Group Army) are stationed to the North of the neighbouring Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, within close striking distance of Hong Kong. In addition, significant numbers of People's Armed Police (PAP, which in wartime would be integrated into the PLA) are deployed within the Shenzhen area itself; it is likely that these PAP alone would be sufficient to overwhelm the colony.

3. The boundary between the New Territories and Shenzhen can be penetrated relatively easily. The going would become progressively more difficult towards the South of the peninsula, but marine troops based (within 12 hours' sailing time) at Zhanjiang could be deployed in support, with naval and air assistance. The Chinese would readily be able to achieve an enormous numerical superiority against the Hong Kong garrison's four regular infantry battalions (slightly over 3,000 men).

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