Japan's security rested on global rather than regional issues.
It was a pity that security structures did not reflect the fact
that Japan and European countries were in practice a part of the
same alliance (Cooper).
China/Hong Kong/Taiwan
5.
Mr Howell made an impressive introduction: the problem was not
1997 but 1992 when people who were afraid of 1997 would think
seriously about getting out. The comforting assumptions of the
early 1980s had gone and would never return. The more Japanese could emphasise to the Chinese that the future of Hong Kong depended
on what they said and did the better. For the UK there were no easy
answers. Its path on democracy was rather timid, and as far as 1995
was concerned, fudged. Its nationality provisions were also less
than generous. But in each case there were real problems with doing
more.
It was stability rather than democracy that mattered to the West in China. We had expressed our feelings about Tiananmen Square; we now needed to deal with the reality in a practical way. The
great force for modernisation in China was business and we should therefore try to ensure that the economy kept moving (Fujii).
Japan had made its interest in Hong Kong very clear to China over a number of years. When the Chinese sought to reassure the Japanese by saying that they would govern it well the Japanese reply was that this was China's problem. If Hong Kong went wrong it was a nuisance for Japan but for China's aim of modernisation it would be a disaster (Fujii).
Japan should have the major voice in determining the West's policy to China (Howell/Cooper).
RCIAAZ/5
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