CONFIDENTIAL
25
175250
MDHIAN 8123
CONFIDENTIAL
FM TOKYO
TO
IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 787
OF 101435Z SEPTEMBER 90
HKB 020 12
1: 1990
TOP COPY Q DIST?
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKREP BRUSSELS, ROME, BONN INFO PRIORITY PARIS, HONG KONG, PEKING
FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
MIPTS: SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER : CHINA/HONG KONG
1. NAKAYAMA SAID THAT AFTER THE HOUSTON SUMMIT HE HAD SENT THE DEPUTY MINISTER TO CHINA TO EXPLAIN JAPANESE VIEWS. HE CONFIRMED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT ALL
JAPANESE YEN LOANS TO CHINA WERE UNTIED AND THEREFORE
THE PROJECTS FUNDED WERE OPEN TO BIDS FROM ALL COUNTRIES.
2 =
NAKAYAMA SAID THAT THE PROSPERITY OF HONG KONG WAS
IMPORTANT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE JAPANESE
HAD A STRONG INTEREST IN THE WARINESS OF THE HONG KONG
BUSINESS COMMUNITY OVER 1997. THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER HAD TOLD HIM OF THE NUMBER OF HONG KONG
IMMIGRANTS TO BRAZIL.
3.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THAT JAPANESE AND UK
APPROACHES TO CHINA WERE SIMILAR. HE HAD UNDERSTOOD THE
JAPANESE DECISION TO SEND A DEPUTY MINISTER TO PEKING.
WE HAD DONE THE SAME AND MR MAUDE'S VISIT HAD BEEN A SUCCESS. HE HAD NOT SHIRKED RAISED HUMAN RIGHTS. THE UK WAS WORKING FROM WITHIN THE EC TO RELAX COMMERCIAL
CONTACTS WITH CHINA. SOME OTHER EC MEMBERS WERE RELUCTANT.
BUT THE UK POINT OF VIEW WAS MAKING PROGRESS.
4. ON HONG KONG THE UK HAD TO STRIKE A DIFFERENT BALANCE, ON THE ONE HAND HONOURING THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH
CHINA AND KEEPING CHINA'S COMMENTS ABOUT HONG KONG LOW KEY, AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, REASSURING HONG KONG, FOR EXAMPLE BY INTRODUCING SOME DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN 1991. SOME REASSURANCE SEEMED TO HAVE GOT THROUGH AND THE ATMOSPHERE IN HONG KONG WAS LESS FEVERISH THAN A YEAR EARLIER.
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