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ultimate responsibility for the good government of the territory in the face of a hostile or uncooperative legislature.
4.
In the case of Hong Kong, a theoretical official majority existed in the legislature until 1984, when for the first time the number of appointed unofficial members exceeded the total number of official members theoretically appointable. The present moment, when the first steps are being taken towards an elected regislature, is realistically the last time when it would be politically-feasible to introduce reserved powers for
the Governor to legislate by himself. In the absence of.such- powers it would remain possible for FMG to bring legislation
into force in Hong Kong without the assent of the Legislative
Council, but only by use of an Order-in-Council made in London under the prerogative a right which is preserved by the
Letters Patent.
5.
our
The principal argument in favour of introducing reserved
powers for the Governor is that it is conceivable that, at some stage before 1997, we might face a hostile Legislative Council
in Hong Kong which refused to pass legislation which HMG considered essential, for instance in relation to defence, or
international relations. In such circumstances, to impose legislation from London would be highly undesirable. It would
be akin to direct rule, and would also run counter to our general aim to make sure that Hong Kong law stands on its own, separate from UK law, by 1997.
6. The Governor has however argued strongly against the introduction of these reserved powers on the following grounds:
(a) It would be regarded by public opinion in Hong Kong
as an advance declaration of no confidence in the elected legislature which we are about to set up. (Such a view might well be reflected at Westminister.)
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.../(b)
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