CONFIDENTIAL
(b) It would, unless later changed, tie us to a rigid
3 yearly timetable of elections between now and 1997.
This might well not fit in with the requirements of constitutional development in the period, which could require accelerated elections at any point. It would
also mean an election in 1997.
9.
The Governor has argued against giving himself the power to dissolve the legislature other than at 3 yearly intervals on
the grounds that:
10.
(a) Such a power is highly unlikely to be used between now
and 1988: there will have to be changes following the
review of constitutional development scheduled for 1987, and the opportunity will exist then to add the power in question, if it is considered desirable, at a time when the programme for constitutional development up to 1997 should be clearer. He also argues that the
timing of elections could be changed at any time by a specific legislative act.
(b) If such a provision was made now it would provide the
Chinese Government with a good argument to include similar powers in the Basic Law for the Chief Executive of the SAR. The Governor argues that a determined Chief Executive might use repeated dissolutions to frustrate the legislature, and that in the absence of a power of dissolution there would be a strong incentive to reach an acceptable compromise in any deadlock.
These points should not be lightly dismissed. But I have concluded that the balance of argument is against them. I believe that we shall need flexibility in the timing of elections in Hong Kong up to 1997. The Governor himself does not rule out the need for a power of dissolution to be provided later,
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