TNAG-2014-FCO40-2865B-Constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-1991-1990 — Page 137

CONFIDENTIAL

ultimate responsibility for the good government of the

territory in the face of a hostile or uncooperative legislature.

4. In the case of Hong Kong, a theoretical official majority

existed in the legislature until 1984, when for the first time

the number of appointed unofficial members exceeded the total

number of official members theoretically appointable. The

present moment, when the first steps are being taken towards

an elected legislature, is realistically the last time when it

would be politically feasible to introduce reserved powers for

the Governor to legislate by himself. In the absence of such

powers it would remain possible for HMG to bring legislation

into force in Hong Kong without the assent of the Legislative

Council, but only by use of an Order-in-Council made in London

under the prerogative a right which is preserved by the

Letters

Patent.

5. The principal argument in favour of introducing reserved

powers for the Governor is that it is conceivable that, at some

stage before 1997, we might face a hostile Legislative Council

in Hong Kong which refused to pass legislation which HMG

considered essential, for instance in relation to defence, or our

international relations. In such circumstances, to impose

legislation from London would be highly undesirable. It would

be akin to direct rule, and would also run counter to our

general aim to make sure that Hong Kong law stands on its own, separate from UK law, by 1997.

6 ·

The Governor has however argued strongly against the

introduction of these reserved powers on the following grounds:

(a) It would be regarded by public opinion in Hong Kong

as an advance declaration of no confidence in the

elected legislature which we are about to set up.

(Such a view might well be reflected at Westminister.)

CONFIDENTIAL

.../(b)

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