TNAG-2008-FCO40-2856-Basic-Law-constitutional-development-in-Hong-Kong-relations-1990 — Page 11

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(h)

dramatic

course have the ability to leave Hong

Kong before 1997 and in these circumstances would

be likely to do so.

The severe decline in confidence resulting from this situation would mean that there was a greatly

increased demand for emigration into the UK, on

the grounds "that the Joint Declaration has failed".

There is another scenario in which we avoid openly flouting the Basic Law but decline agreement with the Chinese

on directly elected seats in 1997 and later. For example,

we decide now for 20 directly elected seats in 1991 on the

assumption that the Basic Law provides for 20 in 1997. We would go straight up to the ceiling but not beyond.

But in

In theory this would be less confrontational and would

avoid some of the adverse consequences above. practice the two scenarios would be likely to merge. The Chinese would see such a move as a rejection of their package and would withdraw their offer, probably reverting to more restrictive figures. We could therefore find we were still

going over the Basic Law limit. Nor would the Chinese believe that having kicked over the

the traces in 1991 we were

not going to go further in 1995/7. We would be under strong

Hong Kong pressure to do so, thereby preserving an upward

movement and meeting the OMELCO consensus. Even if we had

not intended it, in the absence of agreement with the Chinese a confrontational atmosphere would be likely to develop.

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