TNAG-1986-FCO40-2819-Presentation-of-UK-policy-on-Hong-Kong-to-the-media-1989 — Page 177

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

DSR 11C (Revised 5/87)

tragic events, confidence in Hong Kong has been severely

shaken. No one is more dismayed or angry than I

am at

the damage done in the name of China to the faith and

confidence of all of us who have laboured hard over the

years to construct a solid relations with the People's

Republic of China and to build a secure future for Hong

Kong. But despite the deplorable events in Peking, the

underlying reality remains that 92% of Hong Kong's

territory must revert to Chinese sovereinty in 1997 under

the terms of the original lease and the remaining 8%

would simply not be viable on its own. The Joint

Declaration reflects our determination to secure the best

possible agreement for Hong Kong in the face of that

reality. It is clearly better that Hong Kong should be

returned to China with all the safeguards contained in

the Joint Declaration than without them.

3.

In their report published on 30 June, the Select

Committee on Foreign Affairs described the Joint

Declaration as "the best and surest treaty base for the

future of Hong Kong". The official members of Hong

Kong's Executive and Legislative Councils (OMELCO) have

also endorsed that view. The Joint Declaration spells

out the kind of future we want for Hong Kong ie the

preservation of Hong Kong's capitalist system, links with

the outside world and basic rights and freedoms for at

least 50 years. There is no case for scrapping it, or

attempting to unravel if for there is no certainty that

we would end up with a better agreement for Hong Kong

Comments

Approved members can add comments, bookmarks, and private notes.

No comments yet.

Private Research Note

Private notes are available after approval.