TNAG-1971-FCO40-2804-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-repatriation-1989 — Page 67

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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after the passage of reasonable time, it becomes clear that

voluntary repatriation is not making sufficient progress towards the desired objective, alternatives, recognised as being acceptable

under international practice, would be examined". There is no

explicit mention of mandatory repatriation, nor is there any set

timetable or mechanism to implement it.

9. Were it not for the prospect of a major new influx of boat

people in Hong Kong, and the impending political crisis in the

territory, it might have been possible to live with such an

imprecise formula. Our objectives for the ICIR (Mr Colvin's submission of 23 March) as currently agreed by Ministers, are to ensure that the possibility of mandatory repatriation is not ruled

out at the Conference. The Governor's view is that this objective

now needs to be substantially revised. I agree: such an outcome in Geneva in June (when the crisis is likely to be close to its peak) would be seen in Hong Kong as failure: it would aggravate the mood there and intensify resentment of HMG for having 'let Hong Kong down'. We need to be demonstrating to public opinion in the territory that we are defending Hong Kong's interests as robustly as

we can.

10. It is too early at this stage to define our objectives for

the Conference very precisely, but I suggest that they should be:

(a)

to achieve agreement in principle that mandatory repatriation would begin by early 1990;

(b) to establish a special sub committee charged with the task of setting up a mechanism for this and starting implementation of a mandatory programme within the agreed timescale.

I do not underestimate the likely extent of resistance to this

approach. We will need to proceed very carefully to ensure that

UNHCR, the United States and Vietnam do not feel forced to take a

firmly negative public position which could block the prospects of further progress.

Behind the scenes lobbying, particularly of the Americans, will be necessary. Our main allies will be the ASEAN

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