TNAG-1971-FCO40-2804-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-repatriation-1989 — Page 136

SECRET

DIST

MKO 243 Dist?

243190

(10)

046232

MDHIAN 7225

SECRET

FM HONG KONG

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 931

OF 171145Z MARCH 89

(109)

683:

YRTELNO 683: VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE: POST 16 JUNE ARRIVALS

1. I REMAIN PROFOUNDLY SCEPTICAL ABOUT ANY IDEA OF RECLASSIFYING POST 16 JUNE ARRIVALS. ALTHOUGH THERE IS A SUPERFICIALLY ATTRACTIVE ARGUMENT THAT REDEFINING THE 10,000 POST 16 JUNE ARRIVALS AS REFUGEES WOULD REDUCE THE SCALE AND POLITICAL SENSITIVITY OF THE ULTIMATE REPATRIATION PROBLEM, THIS MUST BE SET AGAINST THE FOLLOWING VERY

HEAVY COSTS:

(I) A CHANGE OF TACK ON REFUGEE STATUS WOULD REINFORCE THE GENERAL VIEW IN THE CAMPS (AND WE SUSPECT VIETNAM) THAT HONG KONG IS THE SOFTEST OPTION IN THE REGION. THE GENERAL VIEW IN THE CAMPS SEEMS TO BE THAT THE HONG KONG AUTHORITIES HAVE A HISTORY OF RELAXING TOUGH POLICIES EG THE CLOSED CAMP POLICY, AND THAT THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT WE WILL AGAIN RELENT. VBPS HAVE THEREFORE ONLY TO WAIT A FEW YEARS IN THE DETENTION CENTRES AND RESETTLEMENT WILL AGAIN BE MADE AVAILABLE. IF WE WERE TO MOVE OUR EFFECTIVE DATE FOR SCREENING FORWARD TO SAY JUNE 1989 IE POST ICIR, WE WOULD REINFORCE THIS VIEW AND GENERATE A NEW FLOOD OF ARRIVALS.

•

(II) WE WOULD ENCOUNTER SERIOUS POLITICAL OPPOSITION LOCALLY TO SUCH A MOVE. MANY MEMBERS OF LEGCO AND OF THE PUBLIC ARE SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF OUR PRESENT POLICY. THERE WOULD BE WIDESPREAD AND DEEPLY FELT OPPOSITION TO WHAT WOULD BE SEEN AS A WEAKENING OF OUR RESOLVE.

2. YOU WOULD ALSO NEED TO CONSIDER THE PREDICTABLE CHINESE REACTION

ALTHOUGH THIS IS NOT MY MAIN CONCERN.

3. TWO MINIMUM CONDITIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE MET BEFORE THE IDEA WOULD

BE WORTH CONSIDERING SERIOUSLY:

I) A WORKABLE MANDATORY REPATRIATION MECHANISM OPERATING WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT, AND

II) FIRM, CAST-IRON, COMMITMENTS FOR THE RESETTLEMENT OF THESE ADDITIONAL 10,000 REFUGEES, PLUS THE 15,000 ODD ALREADY CLASSIFIED AS

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