Pace 9
CONFIDENTIAL
Confidence in the Future
7.
The most obvious effect of the recent events in China has been to undermine severely local confidence in the future of Hong Kong, and in particular in the PRC's willingness to allow the territory to have the high degree of autonomy promised in the Joint Declaration. This loss of confidence has already been expressed in increased efforts to emigrate and in widespread emotional demands for HMG to provide a right of entry or right of abode for all Hong Kong British nationals. Some have also suggested that the implementation of the Joint Declaration should be monitored by the United Nations or the international community; others that a commercial deal should be struck with China to delay its full
imposition.
8.
But amidst a plethora of proposals of doubtful practicality, there remains a general acceptance that the Joint Declaration must,
in practice, be the foundation of Hong Kong's future. Few have called for it to be revoked. There have, however, been widespread demands for specific sections of the draft Basic Law to be extensively revised so as to give the people of Hong Kong more concrete guarantees that the Chinese Government will
interfere in the territory's internal affairs after 1997.
9.
This
not
potentially very is its people. We of our best and
loss of confidence is serious. Hong Kong's main resource cannot afford to lose too many brightest. But, with 1997 less than 8 years away, there is little time to put in place the safeguards such people need in order to stay in Hong Kong.
10. Particularly worrying is the effect of recent events on the civil service. Hitherto it has been less affected by emigration than the private sector. The Hong Kong Government, with HMG's support in key areas, has been able to keep up morale and efficiency. This is now going to be much more difficult. Fewer civil servants
will
to
feel prepared to transfer their ultimate allegiance a government that has demonstrated such ruthlessness and disregard for human life. But it is vital, both for the period before 1997 and for afterwards, that we should retain a stable and efficient civil service in
Hong Kong. Time alone will tell whether the new arrangements on nationality that HMG has undertaken to announce will be sufficient to ensure this.
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Internal Social and Political Implications
11.
in
Many people who took part in the demonstrations. Hong Kong had never before participated in any form of political activity in the territory. But the events in China had a particular emotional dimension that does not apply to local political issues. It therefore seems unlikely that this degree of public involvement will normally carry over into purely internal matters. But the community now has an experience of mass political activity. Other issues related to China or to 1997, or even certain domestic issues, particularly if they arose during an economic downturn, could in future stimulate a similar level of response.
12.
The
demonstrations
communal
were
restraint
and
almost entirely good-natured occasions. They represented an impressive degree of
sense of responsibility. The disorder in Mongkok on the night of 6/7 June, which was quickly and efficiently brought under control by the police, paradoxically served to strengthen the community's desire not to upset Hong Kong's social stability. Nevertheless there must be some concern that the territory may become more volatile as 1997 approaches. In a city as crowded as Hong Kong, it is easy
minor incidents to flare up and get out of hand. Experience has now shown that the legal restraints on demonstrations in the Public Order Ordinance are not always enforceable. A different approach will be needed.
13.
the
The
demonstrations
success
were
remarkably well-organised, often at very short notice, largely by social activists of the Christian Industrial Committee. Their
should have greatly strengthened the pro-democracy groups. But they, and their leaders, continue to be divided among themselves on both aims and tactics. They have noticeably failed to broaden the base of their support.
14.
Apart from Martin Lee and Szeto Wah, almost no non-official members of the Executive and Legislative Councils were involved in the mass demonstrations. This
initially had some effect on their credibility as community leaders. Subsequently they have responded more vigorously, both in condemning the violence in Peking and in taking up the campaign on the nationality issue. But no non-official, not even Martin Lee or Szeto Wah, has effectively been able to take the opportunity to establish credentials as a real political leader.
15.
One immediate effect of the events in Peking, even before 4 June, was the emergence of a general
CONFIDENTIAL
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