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Conversely, no nation OOA is ever likely to pose a threat on the scale of the WP to the UK itself, and if a major crisis arose in Europe while British NATO forces were committed OOA, strategic priorities indicate that they should return to fulfil their NATO tasks as quickly as possible. There is danger that such a system can produce misleading paper capabilities dependent in fact on unestablished improvisation. If British forces are decreased in size the proportion required for "double-earmarking" is likely to grow and it will become increasingly important to identify any elements or capabilities which are specific to 00A, both to ensure that they are properly costed and resourced, and that they are safeguarded in CFE. development of ERB.
40.
The former should be facilitated by the
Intelligence Warning and STAR. It will be essential that the UK's limited military resources are targeted effectively. It will thus be necessary to obtain timely warning of threatening developments so that appropriate deterrent or palliative action can be taken. This will require maintenance of, or access to, a wide range of intelligence-gathering facilities from the human to space-based surveillance, which should be unlimited by weather. In theatre, forces will require appropriate STAR facilities and it would be highly desirable if a SOR capability optimized against surface targets were available for obtaining all-arms target
information.
41.
Forward Bases. Forward bases will remain important as potential mounting bases and staging posts. Cyprus,
is likely to remain of particular significance for operations in the regions OOA of greatest strategic interest to the UK, while Gibraltar offers unique national naval base and dockyard facilities, in addition to
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