SECRET UK EYES A
also be extended to maritime situations, where professional expertise will be at a premium. The UN is thus likely to have
to depend on experienced maritime powers for the provision of
forces, which could imply a greater reliance on Western
nations, including the UK.
LIMITED WAR
33. The potential hazards of limited war OOA are such that it is difficult to conceive of a purely national operation except for the protection of dependencies, and even here it is likely
that at least the tacit support of allies will be required.
Furthermore, the limited size of the forces which the UK is
likely to be able to commit and their finite sustainability,
indicate that a British contribution to a larger allied force
should consist primarily of skills and capabilities rather
than of mass. The scale of such a conventional conflict OOA
is most unlikely ever to rival the predicted extent of a
NATO/WP confrontation but it could reach local pitches of
comparable intensity, and EW and Deception both have rôles of
potentially growing importance in enhancing British fighting
power.
34. During the period CW may well be employed by an enemy. In the NATO context CW are classified as weapons of mass destruction to which a nuclear response might be appropriate, but such retaliation is likely to be considered
disproportionate in a tactical situation O0A. of the UK's allies only the US, and possibly France, would be likely to possess CW and in their absence British forces would probably be forced to rely on conventional counter-measures and passive protection. The tempo of operations is thus liable to be
slowed down and the conflict prolonged, which in terms of
sustainability would act to the UK's disadvantage.
mb.1s2
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UK EYES A SECRET
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