TNAG-1939-FCO40-2765-Future-of-Hong-Kong-defence-and-public-order-1989 — Page 132

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powers will go along with our plans.

4.

These discussions have now taken place, first with Australia and

then with New Zealand, as recommended by Mr Gillmore in his minute

of 15 December 1988. Sir John Coles saw Mr Beazley, Australian

Defence Minister, on 14 February. Beazley's reaction both to the

principle of close consultation between the external powers and to

the UK's specific plans for its own input, were favourable. He also

approved of our intention to make a parallel approach to New

Zealand (see Canberra telegram 137 and FCO telno 36).

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5. Lord Glenarthur will recall that he had much the same

reaction from Mr Beazley during his own visit to Australia at the

end of February.

6.

Mr Byatt called on the New Zealand Defence Minister, Mr Tizard,

on 28 February. Tizard's response to our proposal for close

coordination with the external powers was again very positive

perhaps more so than Mr Gillmore expected (see Wellington telno 76

and FCO telno 52). It has subsequently emerged that any lack of

enthusiasm for FPDA in the New Zealand government lies with the

Foreign Minister, Mr Marshall. But SPD advise that Marshall has a

good deal less influence than Tizard on the Prime Minister.

7.

In commending the paper, Lord Glenarthur might draw attention to Mr Beazley's remarks to Sir John Coles about recent Singapore

pressure on Australia to make the FPDA more operational, particularly evident when Lee Kuan Yew visited Australia late last

year. This is in tune with Singapore Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng's recent statement that Singapore believes countries in the region should look to strengthening the various intra-ASEAN defence arrangements to enable the region to increase its defensive capability as the US commitment in the area lessens.

8.

Information that recently came to hand from the DA in Singapore suggests that Singapore has now given up the idea to which Mr Beazley specifically referred, that of a permanent command structure

for FPDA. This might have given us problems because, as the SEAD

paper notes, actual UK resources on offer to FPDA are very limited.

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