TNAG-1911-FCO40-2715-Financial-assistance-from-the-UK-Government-to-Vietnamese-re-1989 — Page 48

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reason, but because it is the one which we judge to be the minimum necessary to induce the Vietnamese to cooperate. If we can negotiate a lower figure, all well and good. The content of any programme of assistance cannot be determined until we have

ascertained (on the basis of discussions with the Vietnamese and

advice from the NGOs) what the requirements are. But we envisage

money being spent on such items as tools and other equipment, vehicles and vocational training.

7. The bid for funds for monitoring is similarly tentative. At

this stage we have been unable to persuade any NGO to do this, let

alone ascertain what form the monitoring might take and what the

costs might be. The sum required would of course also depend on the numbers involved, which remains an open question.

8. The draft minute seeks to capitalise on the fact that expenditure earmarked for a Refugee Processing Centre may now not be needed. The latest position is that a project may go ahead, possibly in the current financial year, but on a much diminshed

scale. We have no way of knowing what size of contribution will be required from HMG (in June we pledged up to £5 million for this

project). But on the advice of Finance Department that a bid should

still be entered, we have included an estimated figure of £2m. The draft indicates that we will revert to the Treasury when the position is clearer.

9. The draft minute and annexes also takes account of the points raised in the Chief Secretary's letter of 9 August and his

predecessor's letter of 29 June. Earlier correspondence with the Treasury about finance is attached. I apologise for the degree of detail in the annexes: however this is in my view (and that of RMD/Finance Department) necessary in order to demonstrate that we have a sound case.

Ariane

A R Paul

SAMACZ

CONFIDENTIAL