TNAG-1908-FCO40-2712-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-voluntary-and-mandatory-repat-1989 — Page 192

220929Z

COMMENT

SECRET

FM HANOI

TO IMMEDIATE FCD

TELNO 579

OF 01090OZ NOVEMBER 89

INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

no dist

HKB

24319

PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR HONG KONG

MY TELNO 573

VBP: REPATRIATION: CALL ON LE THO, DIRECTOR OF CONSULAR DEPARTMENT MFA.

SUMMARY

生

LE THO WISHED IT UNDERSTOOD THAT DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING

THE JUNE AGREEMENT WAS NOT CAUSED BY THE VIETNAMESE SIDE. HMG

SHOULD INDICATE IN WRITING THAT IT WISHED TO PROCEED BILATERALLY, SUGGESTED OMINOUSLY THAT THERE MAY REMAIN QUESTIONS TO RESOLVE BEFORE FIRST FLIGHT COULD TAKE PLACE. NOVEMBER DATES MAY THERFORE BE OVER-AMBITIOUS.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED THIS AFTERNOON ON LE THO AT HIS REQUEST. HIS FIRST CONCERN WAS TO ENSURE THAT WE BOTH UNDERSTOOD THAT THE DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN JUNE HAD NOT BEEN CAUSED BY THE VIETNAMESE SIDE. HE INDICATED THAT SOME MEDIA REPORTS HAD SEEMED TO LAY THE BLAME ON THE VIETNAMESE. I REASSURED HIM THAT WE WERE CERTAINLY NOT BLAMING THE VIETNAMESE AND HE VOLUNT- EERED THAT HE QUITE UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEMS ON OUR SIDE.

3. HE THEN AFFECTED TO BE PUZZLED BY HMG'S ATTITUDE AT THE SCO INDGENEVA. HE CLAIMED THAT HE HAD BEENIGIVEN A COPY OF OUR DRAFT CONCLUSIONS AT HIS MEETING WITH MCLAREN BEFORE THE CONFERENCE STARTED AND THAT THESE SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT HYD WAS INTERESTED IN A MULTILATERAL APPROACHURATHER THAT THE BIALTERAL APPROACH WHICH WE HAD ALREADY UNDERTAKEN. HE GAVE ME A

COPY OF OUR DRAFT. ON THE BASIS OF A QUICK READING ISAID THAT THERE APPREARED TO BE NO CONFLICT BETWEEN IT AND OUR BIALTERAL AGREEMENT, AND THAT AS FAR AS I WAS CONCERNED THE WORKING DOCUMENT WAS THE JUNE AGREEMENT. HE ASKED THAT I LET HIM HAVE ANOTE EXPLAINGING THIS POINT. I SAID THAT I QOULD BE HAPPY TO AND SAID THAT IN ANY CASE I HOPED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH HIME IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO DEMONSTRATE IN A PRACTICAL WAY THAT WHATEVER WENT ON IN GENEVA WE WOULD WISH TO PURSUE MATTERS SILATERALLY. I THOUGHT IT PRUDENT TO ALERT LE THO TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT WE MINGTXXXXXXX MIGHT WELL SEEK TO SIGN THE AGREED MINUTE AND PROPOSE A FIRST FLIGHT FOR TWO OR THREE WEEKS FROM NOW. LE THO LOOKED SERIOUSLY CONCERNED AND INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THIS WOULD BE RUSHING THINGS AMD MINGHT BE IMPRACTICAL. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT ONCE WE WERE READY TO RESUME NOGOTIATIONS, THERE WOULD BE SOME QUESTIONS TO RESOLVE. HE REFUSED TO GIVE ANY HINT WHAT THESE MIGHT BE.

4. AT SEVERAL POINTS DURING THE DISCUSSION, THO WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO EMPHASISE THAT THE VIETNAMESE REMAINED OPPOSED TO THE

USE OF FORCE. I LEFT HIM UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO COME A TIME WHEN THE VIETNAMESSE WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT THE FORECED RETURN OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATNTS.

CONCLUSIONS

5. CLEARLY, THE SOONER WE GET ON WITH THIS EXERCISE THE BETTER. IF NOTHING ELSE, THE SOONER WE LEARN WHAT PROBLEMS REMAIN, THE SOONER WE CAN GET DOWN TO SOLVING THEM, JUDGING FROM TODAYS PERFORMANCE, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOG ASSUEM THAT THE VIETNAMESE WILL BE RUNNING AT FVOTSPSED WHEN WE DECIDE TP PRESS THE BUTTON.

DAVIES

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ADVANCE

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HD/HKD

MAIN

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SEAD HKD

[BAILEY)

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