TNAG-1908-FCO40-2712-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-voluntary-and-mandatory-repat-1989 — Page 173

CONFIDENTIAL

010402 MDHIAN 4955

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 2977

OF 162008Z NOVEMBER 89

HKB 243 i 12

INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG, HANOI, UKMIS GENEVA

230

OUR TELNO 2877: VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE

1.

A DECISION TO PROCEED WITH INVOLUNTARY REPATRIATION IS BOUND TO BE A MAJOR ISSUE HERE. WE HAVE BEEN GIVING FURTHER THOUGHT TO HOW BEST TO HANDLE THE LIKELY US REACTION.

2. AS OUR CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS HERE IN RECENT WEEKS TO EXPLAIN HONG KONG'S PROBLEMS HAVE SHOWN, WE ARE NOT GOING TO GET THE ADMINISTRATION TO SUPPORT US ON THIS ISSUE. THE PRESIDENT COMMENTED TO ME RUEFULLY LAST WEEK THAT MUCH AS HE HATED THE THOUGHT OF BEING ON OPPOSITE SIDES OF AN ISSUE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, HE FEARED THAT IT WAS INEVITABLE ON THIS OCCASION. AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND, THE BEST WE CAN HOPE FOR FROM THE ADMINISTRATION IS AGREEMENT TO DISAGREE AS QUIETLY AS POSSIBLE AND WITH MINIMUM BLOWBACK FOR OTHER BILATERAL BUSINESS. IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT FOR THE PRESENT AT LEAST - THE ADMINISTRATION SEEM ANXIOUS TO FENCE OFF THE VBP ISSUE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE (MY TUR).

-

3. IF WE ARE TO SUCCEED IN CONTAINING THE ADMINISTRATION'S REACTION, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT NOT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF BOUNCING A DECISION ON THEM. YOU WILL NO DOUBT BE CONSIDERING HOW BEST TO INFORM THE ADMINISTRATION OF OUR DECISION. AS SEEN FROM HERE IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO GIVE THEM AT LEAST SOME, SAY 24 HOURS, ADVANCE NOTICE. IDEALLY WE SHOULD GIVE MORE. PERHAPS A SOLUTION MIGHT BE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO TELL PRESIDENT BUSH ON 24 NOVEMBER THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN, WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAILS ABOUT TIMING. WE COULD THEN GIVE THE AMERICANS 24 HOURS

NOTICE BEFORE THE FIRST FLIGHT WAS DUE. IN THAT WAY THEY COULD HARDLY CLAIM NOT TO HAVE BEEN PROPERLY FOREWARNED.

4.

THE EXTENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REACTION WILL, HOWEVER, ALSO DEPEND GREATLY ON PRESSURE GENERATED BY REACTIONS ON THE

HILL AND IN THE MEDIA. IF THAT IS EXTREME, THE ADMINISTRATION MAY FEEL COMPELLED TO GO BEYOND QUIET DISAGREEMENT. WE THEREFORE

NEED TO ENSURE THAT OUR PUBLIC PRESENTATION IS AS EFFECTIVE AS

POSSIBLE. WE SHOULD ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE ADMINISTRATION

WILL FEEL OBLIGED TO RESPOND TO ANY CRITICISM OF US

ATTITUDES (EG DOUBLE STANDARDS) FROM LONDON OR HONG KONG. 5. AS SEEN FROM HERE THERE ARE TWO CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MIGHT

1

PAGE

CONFIDENTIAL