TNAG-1907-FCO40-2711-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-voluntary-and-mandatory-repat-1989 — Page 35

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and other (eg over Cambodia) demands accordingly. On balance, I advise against this course and recommend that we proceed step by step. We might, however, to whet Vietnamese appetites, instruct our Ambassador in Hanoi to inform the Vietnamese when he signs the Agreed Minute that we want early talks after the first return and that we hope to respond to their interest in aid to areas in Vietnam where the boat people are coming from. FCO and ODA officials are discussing the whole quesion of reintegration aid and will submit their ideas in due course.

Preparation for SC3 (resumed)

9 The main problem is to persuade the Americans to show flexibility over involuntary return. (As indicated above the Prime Minister's visit would provide a valuable opportunity to put across our arguments at the highest level; it could replace the Prime Minister's message which we have had in mind). In addition, I recommend that we concert beforehand with Thailand, Malaysia, Australia and Japan. The general message which we want all these countries to put to the Americans is that the CPA itself will be unlikely to survive a repetition of the recent meeting in Geneva when the Americans vetoed any discussion of alternatives to involuntary repatriation and any time frame for their introduction. In addition, I recommend that we explore with like-minded countries the possibility of our telling the Americans that we intend to work at SC3 for the widest possible agreement on the proposals which we put to the recent meeting and that we intend to implement these proposals after SC3 whether or not the Americans agree.

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D H Colvin