TNAG-1907-FCO40-2711-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-voluntary-and-mandatory-repat-1989 — Page 199

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SHOULD HAVE RETURNED BY AIR BEFORE, SAY, FEBRUARY NEXT YEAR AND THAT WE WOULD BY THEN HAVE MADE PROGRESS ON OUR PLANS TO RETURN

LARGER GROUPS BY SHIP.

2.

·

PARTICUL-

WE WILL COME UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE AT SC3,

ARLY FROM THE US TO POSTPONE THE MANDATORY REPATRIATION PROGRAMME ON THE GROUNDS THAT MORE TIME IS NEEDED TO ALLOW THE VOLUNTARY SCHEME TO GATHER MOMENTUM. THESE ARGUMENTS WILL PROBABLY BE SUPPORTED BY SOME PARTIES, EG THE FRENCH

A DIFFICULT DECISION MAY WELL HOLD SOME ATTRACTION

K

DEFERRING

FOR OTHERS.

THE REALITY IS THAT A FURTHER DELAY WILL NOT/NOT PRODUCE THE

DRAMATIC INCREASES NEEDED IF THE VOLUNTARY PROGRAMME IS TO STAND ALONE. DELAY WOULD HOWEVER COMPOUND OUR CURRENT DIFFICULTIES.

WE HAVE NO PROSPECT OF PERSUADING FINANCE COMMITTE TO PROVIDE FUNDS FOR 1990 UNLESS WE ARE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE SOLID PROGRESS WITH ALL THE CPA SOLUTIONS. FURTHERMORE, IF WE DELAY BEYOND THE AUTUMN WE RUN THE REAL RISK OF FAILING TO GET A DETERRENT

MESSAGE IN PLACE BEFORE THE SAILING SEASON STARTS EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR. ALTHOUGH ARRIVALS IN HONG KONG WILL NOT BUILD UP UNTIL MARCH, PEOPLE START TO MAKE THEIR DECISION TO LEAVE VIETNAM IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY: WE MUST AIM TO INFLUENCE SUCH

DECISIONS THROUGH OUR DETERRENT MESSAGE. IF WE FAIL TO DETER A MAJOR INFLUX IN EARLY 1990, IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR US TO RESIST COMMUNITY PRESSURE FOR AN END TO THE CURRENT POLICY OF FIRST ASYLUM.

TIMETABLE FOR REPATRIATION

3. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE FACTORS, WE HAD ENVISAGED THE WEEK BEGINNING 30 OCTOBER AS THE RIGHT TIMING FOR THE RETURN OF

THE FIRST GROUP. ON REFLECTION, WE NOW THINK THAT THIS IS A LITTLE TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT TO THE ROYAL VISIT AND THAT THE WEEK

BEGINNING 22 OCTOBER WOULD BE BETTER. WE WILL BE READY TO MOUNT

AN OPERATION THAT WEEK. BUT IF WE ARE TO HAVE EVERYTHING IN

PLACE WE NEED CLEARANCE TO PROCEED VERY SOON.

4. EXPERIENCE GAINED IN COUNSELLING THOSE PEOPLE WHO HAVE

ALREADY BEEN SCREENED OUT REINFORCES OUR EARLIER ASSESSMENT THAT

IF THE OPERATION IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL WE SHALL NEED TO BE

ABLE TO USE OUR NORMAL IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES, IF THIS PROVES NECESSARY IN ANY INDIVIDUAL CASE. AUTHORISING THE POLICE AND CSD

TO USE NECESSARY MINIMUM FORCE IS OF COURSE A SENSITIVE ISSUE: BUT WE MUST FACE THE FACT THAT ATTEMPTING AN OPERATION WITHOUT CONTINGENT AUTHORITY WOULD BE TO RUN A HIGH RISK OF FAILURE. AN ATTEMPTED OPERATION WHICH HAD TO BE ABORTED WOULD BE THE

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