TNAG-1907-FCO40-2711-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-voluntary-and-mandatory-repat-1989 — Page 175

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MrJtme 1018 Mistmé ма назуси изя

Secretary of State

9/3

VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

From:

Date:

cc:

Francis Maude

7 August 1989

Mr Gillmore News Dept

KD SAED

Lock Brabazon

1. We spoke briefly on the phone about this. You have seen a copy of the enclosed submission, and I think you agree that we should not go ahead with the first batch of returnees under the scheme until some other matters have been explored. The recommendations in para look sensible.

I

2. It is clearly essential that satisfactory monitoring arrangements are in existence, and this will take a little time to set up. There are more encouraging signs from the US, and it must be sensible for us to to pursue this further. have set further work in train on fallback arrangements, and a note should come back to us both imminently. There is much that can be done to improve the perception by the media and other governments of what it is we propose. Again this will

take a little time.

3.

I have asked for further work to be done on enhancing the counselling in the camps to persuade people to agree to both schemes. I am sure a renewed effort to encourage participants in the original scheme should be made; but for others there is likely to be merit in exposing the financial advantages of returning rather more clearly than seems to have been done. There may be a case for enhancing the cash which returnees actually pocket for themselves.

4. I have looked at whether a further attempt might be made to persuade other countries to accept non-refugees for resettlement, if only to establish conclusively that this is not a possibility. As I understand it, at the Geneva Conference in June 1989, none of the 60 or so countries participating, dissented from the view that those who were screened as non-refugees would not be resettled. It seems to me that if we were now to appear to be reopening the idea of resettling screened-out non-refugees, there is a serious danger of undermining the Comprehensive Plan of Action which is the cornerstone of efforts to deter future boatloads.

5. I should record that the Governor believes that delaying the first batch until early September is likely to increase political difficulties in Hong Kong, and make it more difficult to secure a group of acquiescent returnees. I have stressed to him that for such a scheme to have any prospect of