TNAG-1906-FCO40-2710-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-voluntary-and-mandatory-repat-1989 — Page 168

BAGACS (10)

CONFIDENTIAL

acquiesce in repatriation. But it is difficult to see how this

would be worse than the current uninformed speculation.

(e) We should in parallel launch a lobbying campaign in

capitals to bring other governments up to date on what we are

doing. Some (eg the Australians and ASEANs) are likely to be

supportive. Others (eg the Canadians and EC countries) have

shown varying degrees of sympathy but are genuinely unclear

about what we are proposing to do. There is more we can and

should be doing to win them round.

23.

We would need to explain frankly to the Vietnamese the reasons

for the delay, and stress in particular the desirability of squaring

the Americans. (They should appreciate this point, as they have as

much interest in avoiding bad publicity on repatriation as we do.)

But in explaining this to the Vietnamese, we should make it clear

that the delay is only temporary and that we shall want to go ahead

with the non voluntary repatriation of non refugees as soon as it is

practicable to do so.

24. No decision needs to be taken yet about the precise timing of

the return of the first group of non volunteers. One advantage of

delay until September, when Cabinet will have resumed, would be that

it would enable the Secretary of State to inform OD (K) of our

detailed plan. We would in any case need sufficient time to ensure

that a respectable number of returnees (eg 40-60) had been assembled. But we must recognise that there are strong pressures from Hong Kong to press ahead as quickly as possible.

CONFIDENTIAL

Paul

AR Paul