TNAG-1906-FCO40-2710-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-voluntary-and-mandatory-repat-1989 — Page 117

TEXAAK

Mr Godson, SEAD

Reference...

199

AKB

24319

10

VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE :

1.

REPATRIATION

A full

Hong Kong telno 2719 sets out the Hong Kong Government's reaction to the decision that we should delay the repatriation of the first group of non-volunteer non-re fugee boat people.

reply will have to await Mr Gillmore's return from Washington and an assessment of the extent to which American opposition continues, but before then it is possible to set out in black and white a number of the issues to be faced.

2. Firstly, it is my reading from Hong Kong telno 2719 that the timing of the first repatriation exercise will depend very largely on whether Ministers are prepared to authorise the Hong Kong Government to use physical force, however minimal, in returning boat people to Vietnam. I don't know what anyone else thinks, but I do not believe Ministers will be willing to give this authorisation at this stage, and nor do I think we should recommend them to. Washington telno 2178 lists some of the reasons why not.

3.

Which means we should focus our energy on developing a strategy to take us through the autumn in the acceptance that force is not an option.

4. We should not rule out the possibility that Hong Kong will succeed in isolating a group of 'acquiescents' who can be trusted not to resist embarkation at Kai Tak. So the first option we should offer to Hong Kong is that they can proceed with the repatriation of the first group if they are confident in advance that force will not be necessary. Despite our misgivings, the Embassy would have to moniter those returning (see Hanoi telno 423). But if Hong Kong lack this confidence, we must have an alternative course of action to follow.

I recommend that we should consider something along the following lines:

5.

(a) The first repatriation exercise should be delayed until the Steering Committee review meeting in Geneva on 16/17 October.

(b) We will use the intervening time, after securing Vietnamese acceptance, to canvass widespread support for our bilateral repatriation agreement as an appropriate orderly and humane precedent for the region.

(c) The canvassing should include personal messages from the Secretary of State or Mr Maude to their opposite numbers in all countries of first asylum, in ICG countries and to selected other ICIR participants, including in particular the High Commissioner for Refugees. The messages should hark back to those sent out by Sir Geoffrey Howe on the eve of the ICIR.

ODE 18-77