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"a) as its top priority, to establish a firm timetable for the balanced implementation of each component ie. departure, reception and status determination, repatriation and resettlement of the
CPA
...
-
b) to conduct its first assessment of progress achieved by October
1989;
c) to recommend, by that date, the early examination and adoption
(sic) of such additional measures as may be called for, bearing in mind paragraph 12 of the CPA."
(d) Attitude of the United States and the UNHCR
9. Throughout the summer we have made a major effort to persuade
the United States and the UNHCR to accept the logic of the screening
programme and to signal their acquiescence in, if not support for, a
comprehensive programme of mandatory repatriation. But we have met
with strong resistance, both within the American administration and
on the part of the High Commissioner for Refugees, M. Hocke. We
need the cooperation of the UNHCR, who are best placed to serve
channel for reintegration assistance and to take on the role of
monitoring all returnees in Vietnam. But they continue to take the
view that, at a time when the number of volunteers is increasing, it
would be premature to consider alternatives to the voluntary
programme.
as a
10.
In my discussions on 11 September with the US Secretary of
State, Mr Baker, I explained once more that we would soon need to
decide what to do with non-volunteers. Mr Baker repeated
the American argument that an early move to involuntary repatriation would undermine the CPA, set a bad precedent for Thailand and Malaysia, and lead the US Administration to disagree publicly with
But Mr Baker accepted that in order to make the voluntary programme work, the UNHCR, along with other organisations and
resettlement countries, should make greater efforts to persuade
those screened out as non-refugees that there is no alternative to
us.
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