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scheme is unlikely to match the scale of the problem.
8.
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معاه
British and Vietnamese officials met in Hanoi on 26 June and
initialled an agreement to repatriate from Hong Kong people who are determined not to be refugees and who therefore have no prospect of
resettlement (Text at Annex A). It includes provisions for the humane treatment of returnees but includes a passage stating
"The
Vietnamese side considered forcible repatriation inappropriate". Sir Geoffrey Howe and the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, endorsed this agreement when they met in London on 28 June. It was agreed, at Vietnamese request, not to make the contents of the agreement public. There is a risk that the Vietnamese will denounce it if it is revealed without their consent.
9.
On 1 August we and Hanoi agreed the text of a minute (Annex B) detailing the conditions, notably for re-integration assistance, for the first group to be returned under the 26 June Agreement. This minute has yet to be signed. Hong Kong's plans to return the first group in August were not realised. Although the authorities had identified an initial group of people expected to acquiesce in repatriation, press reports and the unhelpful attitude of the UNHCR and the Americans led the Hong Kong authorities to doubt whether those chosen would acquiesce and the operation was postponed. About 140 candidates have been identified for repatriation and counselling
to achieve their acquiescence continues.
Attitude of the United States and the UNHCR
10.
The suggestion that there were acquiescents who would not oppose repatriation opened up the possibility of dialogue with the Americans. A series of official exchanges has taken place, during which some factual misunderstandings have been cleared away. During my discussions with the US Secretary of State, Mr Baker, on 11 September I explained once more that we would soon need to decide
what to do with non-volunteers. Mr Baker repeated American concerns that an early move to involuntary repatriation would undermine the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) agreed by the ICIR set a bad precedent for Thailand and Malaysia, and lead the US Administration to disagree publicly with us. But Mr Baker accepted that in order
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