TNAG-1900-FCO40-2699-Future-of-Hong-Kong-briefing-1989 — Page 12

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THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT IN HONG KONG

candidates for the office of the Chief Executive. Finally, the electoral college would vote on the nominations by the nominating committee.

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The democracy movement criticized this proposal as an attempt to ensure that the conservative business community would control a majority in the electoral college, given its composition. Such an electoral method would not involve ordinary people, nor would it allow them any chance to participate. But the movement failed to get its message across to the community effectively at this time-partly because Chinese officials in Hong Kong had succeeded in isolating it, as described above, and partly because in this period the community's apathy on the subject was growing.

The Chinese authorities have rejected the idea of a referendum on the Basic Law, as a referendum held in a territory administered by the British was considered an infringement of Chinese sovereignty. In the absence of a referendum, the legitimacy of the Basic Law will depend on its endorsement by all the key groups in the territory. Strong opposition by a significant minority will still considerably damage this legitimacy and has to be avoided. This explains the Chinese authorities' emphasis on consensus, and their greater eagerness to cultivate the democracy movement after the release of the first draft of the Basic Law. The choices for the democracy movement at this stage were to get the best deal possible or to be prepared for a confrontation.

The democracy movement's strategy to 1988

A realistic goal for the democracy movement in this period would have been for it to serve as an effective opposition. Any concessions to the movement by Beijing and the conservative business community are likely to be the consequence of their desire to maintain stability and prosperity in Hong Kong, and tolerance of an effective opposition would be based on the same consideration. Various past proposals on the composition of the Hong Kong SAR legislature have allowed for between 25 and 50 per cent of the seats to be directly elected, and 40 per cent would be an achievable target if the democracy movement opted for a compromise. This then-the expansion of the powers of the legislature, powers essential to a system of checks and balances in the Hong Kong SAR political system-is the goal that the democracy movement should adopt. This would also be the best guarantee of the freedom and the rule of law which everyone in Hong Kong treasures, and the best safeguard against the abuse of power, privileges and corruption which are now rampant in China and which Hong Kong people fear will spread to this territory in 1997.

But the democracy movement has to date given scant attention to this issue, and has concentrated largely on the issue of the electoral system. There has been no meaningful examination of the possibilities of a compromise, the consequences of achieving no compromise, the bottom line of the movement's demands and the responses to a rejection of its demands by the Chinese authorities and the conservative business. community.

The democracy movement has also been losing the initiative at the tactical level. It agreed to enter into negotiations with other political groups to seek a compromise on the Hong Kong SAR political system, but many of these political groups lacked representativeness and tended to take a conservative, pro-Beijing stand, and this

17. The Draft Basic Law, p. 78; see also the Business and Professional Group of Members of the Basic Law Consultative Committee, A proposal for the future structure of the Hong Kong SAR government (Hong Kong, Sept. 1987), pp. 18-20. Though the pamphlet was published in Sept. 1987, the main points of the proposal had been intermittently reported by the major newspapers in Hong Kong in 1986.