TNAG-1893-FCO40-2687-Visit-by-Francis-Maude--Minister-of-State-for-Foreign-and-Co-1989 — Page 42

CONFIDENTIAL

we

preparing for further negotiations with the Vietnamese,

should need to consider to what extent we can meet Vietnamese

concerns about aid without compromising our long-standing policy against aid to Vietnam.

(iii) The number of VBPs who can be deported each week if and

when regular movements between Hong Kong and Vietnam begin depend on the following factors:

A) The rate of screening-out: From 16 June 1988 when

screening began, until 7 September, 3011 VBPs had been

definitively screened out (ie including those who had exhuasted

the appeals procedure). The current rate is about 150 per week but the aim is to screen 400 per week. If Hong Kong were able

to deport these VBPS at a rate of 400 per week, this backlog

would take 7-8 weeks to clear. However, as at 7 September,

39,761 VBPs were awaiting screening. The figures above for the first fifteen months of the screening programme indicate that an average of about 200 VBPS a month are being definitively screened out. The actual number of VBPs available for

repatriation as Hong Kong speeds up the screening proccess may increase. There may also be significant numbers of VBPS who volunteer or acquiescence in returning to Vietnam. But it is impossible to say to what extent volunteers or acquiscents will

attest the number of repatriates. It is also impossible to say

at what rate VBPS will continue to arrive at Hong Kong,

increasing the number of those awaiting screening. But unless the rate of screening-out increases very significantly from present levels, the timetable to clear the backlog of all outstanding VBPS will be indefinite.

B) The rate at which Vietnam will accept deported VBPs: this

will be a matter for negotiation between Britain and Vietnam when they meet to discuss future arrangements after the first deportation has taken place. Vietnam's ability to accept regular batches of repatriated VBPS will depend on a number of factors, including reception facilities, housing and the

effectiveness of the Vietnamese Government's re-integration

arrangements. But the Vietnamese Government may also wish to

CONFIDENTIAL