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13. Mr McLaren agreed the trend was very worrying, whatever the
statistics; it could only be reversed by the cumulative impact of
measures to restore confidence. Even if the UK were to say that it
would take all 3.25 million (which it would not) this might not
affect the decisions of those determined to go to the US, Canada and
Australia. He noted that the US immigration quota could well be
raised next year from 5,000 to 10,000.
14. Mr Wrangham said that he had been surprised at the link which
seemed to be being drawn in some quarters in the UK between the
Vietnamese boat people issue and the right of abode question. He
thought there was considerable force in using the argument that
Chinese illegal immigrants were sent straight back to China and that
the same should apply to Vietnamese illegal immigrants. He noted
that the USA already did this in the case of Mexico, Nicaragua and
Cuba.
15. Mr McLaren agreed that the US attitude on this was inconsistent
but in the public conception in the United States, the Vietnamese government was uniquely repugnant.
16. Brigadier Christie asked what HMG could do to persuade the
Chinese to make amendments to the draft Basic Law. Mr McLaren
explained that HMG had tried to get the Chinese to postpone the
drafting process by, say, six months after the events in early June.
The Chinese, while agreeing to extend the consultation period, had
unfortunately not agreed to extend the period for the promulgation.
However very recently there had been reports that the final plenary
drafting session had been moved back from mid January to mid
February.
17. Mr McLaren said that it was necessary to use all possible channels to get views across on the Basic Law to the Chinese.
Clearly the most difficult area was that of the political structure.
What was needed was a consensus in Hong Kong. If this could be
achieved HMG would then use all its powers to persuade the Chinese
to adopt the consensus.
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