CONFIDENTIAL
Mr Fry
LUNCH WITH MESSRS MURATA AND FUJII, 1 August
1. I gave what was tantamount to a farewell lunch on a very small scale to Mr Murata (Vice Minister at the Gaimusho) and There were just the three of us; I had Mr Fujii (Kanbucho). known them both quite well earlier in the 80s when Mr Murata was Director General of the Economic Affairs Bureau and Mr Fujii was successively Deputy Director General of the Asian Affairs Bureau and Consul General in Hong Kong. My purpose was to thank them for the assistance and cooperation which they had given throughout the 80s and particularly to signal the improved relationships between Japan and Western Europe and notably between Japan and the UK.
2.
Nevertheless we discussed three main subjects at some length: Hong Kong, the Prime Minister's visit and domestic politics.
Hong Kong
3. I explained that I had raised this subject with Mr Tanino at the end of last week and then recapitulated what I had said at that time (not surprisingly Mr Tanino had not reported my call since he left for Paris a few hours after it). In particular I emphasised that Britain was not abdicating its responsibilities for Hong Kong but that the international dimension in Hong Kong was now becoming immensely important and in this Japan was a, if not the, major player. My message was very well received particularly in view of Mr Fujii's background. Many Japanese were clearly very seized of the general importance of Hong Kong; the particular importance in the period following the Tiananmen shootings has yet I think to come fully home to them. I said that this was a message which we intended to repeat to Japanese in all influential areas politics, the bureaucracy, business, banks, media etc. They took note and gave me the impression that they would undoubtedly give serious thought to more specific ways in which Japan might help while of course being interested, as they have been hitherto, in preserving investor confidence.
Prime Minister's Visit
4. I briefly ran over the political situation both in Japan and the UK and then I said that I assumed that in Japanese eyes there was no case for a postponement or cancellation of the Prime Minister's visit to Japan. Murata was very clear on this: the Japanese press would have a field day if the visit were postponed, reading into it the worst possible implications. This would inevitably have an unfortunate effect in the Japanese establishment with some repercussions on the course of our
- 1 - CONFIDENTIAL
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.