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geo-political and almost sub-political
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its position on the globe, the size of its population, and the dead weight and/or pole of attraction which this naturally represents. And the methods it must look to for advancing its cause here and now are essentially political ones, while not excluding the political uses of military
power.
MILITARY ASPECTS
4. Relaxation of tension with the Soviet Union should also relax some of the resource pressures on Chinese defence, in a period of budget stringency. But the leeway and the grace for reflection offered thereby will be used to remodel Chinese defences for new and more sophisticated purposes, not to lower them overall. The Soviet threat will not have gone but will be felt in a more wide- spread, more subtle and indirect regional competition. The potential threat from Japan will loom larger: incidentally inclining China to tolerate a continued US military presence in the region as a lesser evil than Japanese self-help, even when it seems less obviously required than before to stave off Soviet aggression. Chinese planners will have a wary eye on the build-up of Indian military strength and propensity to intervene, adding a dimension of possible regional rivalry to the dormant but not dead military confrontation on the Sino-Indian frontier. Vietnam, Indonesia, in the much more distant future a federated Korea will all need watching. The overall result may be to give Chinese strategic planning, in geographical terms, a more Eastward and Southward slant in future. (If so, however, it is unlikely to be publicised because of the obvious concern it could cause to neighbours in those directions.) It will certainly encourage the existing trend to seek sophisticated defensive capability in nuclear weapons, and mobility and flexibility in conventional forces, with special emphasis on the sea and air capability needed for political flag-waving and overseas intervention in the last resort. Participation by Chinese forces in international peace-keeping, its obvious political merits aside, will provide useful experience in the latter context.
5. Possessing effective forces does not mean using them. In recent years China has deployed direct military force only for the recovery or defence of what it sees as national territory, in the Spratly Islands and on the various contested borders. Even there it has seemed to follow a rule of minimum force and of gaining its points by political means when possible, even when this takes (perhaps much) longer. The same strategy clearly applies for the moment Taiwan. The more impressive China can make its pan-regional military reach in future the less likely it may be ever to use its forces in anger, except under the strongest provocation. The political message they convey should be sufficient.
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6. On the other hand I do not see China, during the period of reconstruction, being led to set limitations on its military develop- ment by the political attractions of arms control, let alone the
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/moral
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