TNAG-1862-FCO40-2639-Future-of-Hong-Kong-Basic-Law-1989 — Page 89

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to account. It is, however, for consideration that, were machinery

to be devised for some wider degree of consultation before the Central Authorities intervened in the sense of the last paragraph of

Article 18, some participation of the Legislature (eg a resolution)

might be envisaged.

7. The movement for a more democratic Legislature in Hong Kong has not, however, so far as I am aware specifically focussed on the question of intervention by the Central Authorities as regards

Articles 14 and 18. It is concerned with providing a broaden base

for the legislative balance vis-a-vis the Executive and with making

the SAR government more responsive to popular opinion. This in turn would provide a broader base for the Legislature as regards its capacity to influence the Central Authorities.

8. Unlike the Article 14/18 issue (see para 5 above) it would be possible to give effect to present demands for a greater democratic representation in the current legislature without straining

credulity, even though the primary object of such a step is intended

to have effect after 1997. The issue here is whether such a step would outlive 1997. Whatever regime emerges in Peking, it is

unlikely to wish to adopt in the next two years a form of

representation in Hong Kong which could produce too great a

disparity with, and resentment on, the mainland; and Peking may well be in no position to acquiesce in such a disparity even in eight

years time.

Any attempt now by the present Hong Kong authorities

which makes any significant advance on the programme set out in

Annex II to the Basic Law may therefore founder in 1997 (and by

declared inapplicable under Article 159), because it is inconsistent

with the Basic Law. Further, if it does founder, the provision

whereby the last Legislature of the Colony becomes the first

Legislature of the SAR is also likely to founder. Taken together

with the current (totally inadequate) provisions for the election of

the first Chief Executive and the first government (and a probable

Chinese unwillingness to change them in the face of unlilateral

action by Hong Kong on the Legislature), that would be likely to see the end of the policy of convergence. Paradoxically, the creation

of a proto Chief Executive in a way that reflects the Basic Law may

offer fewer hostages for the future. It deserves examination.

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