TNAG-1851-FCO40-2626-House-of-Commons-Select-Committee-on-Foreign-Affairs-enquiry-1989 — Page 122

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

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could refer only to war with a foreign country, but we are convinced that in no other circum- stances should the central government have powers to interfere in the maintenance of public order in Hong Kong. To have such powers is to contravene the provisions of the Joint Declar- ation. We therefore believe that Article 18 of the second draft of the Basic Law needs revision.

2.13. Section XII of Annex I to the Joint Declaration, the Elaboration by the Government of the People's Republic of China of the Basic Policies Regarding Hong Kong states that "Military forces sent by the Central People's Government to be stationed in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for the purpose of defence shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region." As Sir David Wilson told us on 12 June, "The Joint Declaration allows for the stationing in the Hong Kong SAR of Chinese forces if they wish to do so. It does not say they have got to do so."1 We are aware that there have been discussions on this matter in the Joint Liaison Group. The Royal Hong Kong Police is being expanded to take on the public order duties of British forces in the Territory before 1997. Sir David Wilson told us that "people in Hong Kong will look with great concern, in light of what has happened recently, at any suggestion of significant numbers of troops being stationed in the Central area."2 We believe that the British Government should make clear to the Chinese Government the strength of feeling in Hong Kong against any stationing of PLA troops in Hong Kong. 3

Amendment of the Basic Law

2.14 Article 158 states that "The power of amendment of this law shall be vested in the National People's Congress.” Mr Andrew Wong told us in Hong Kong that "the power to amend lies in the hands of the body that enacted the law, the NPC, so we cannot really say that the amendment ought to be approved by some other body."4 We were concerned, however, that amendments proposed from the Hong Kong SAR could only be submitted to the NPC "after obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the deputies of the Region to the National People's Congress, two-thirds of all the members of the Legislative Council of the Region, and the Chief Executive of the Region." Amendments proposed by the Standing Committee of the NPC or the State Council have to meet no conditions before being submitted to the NPC. We believe that proposed amendments to the Basic Law should have the agreement of both the Standing Committee of the NPC and of the Legislative Council and Chief Executive of the Hong Kong SAR before being submitted to the NPC, and, we would therefore support an arrangement such as that proposed by Mr Andrew Wong to ensure that the powers are equal.' We also believe that the final paragraph of Article 158 should be amended so as to make explicit the fact that "The established basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong" are those set out in the Joint Declaration.

Distrust of China

III. ACTIONS WITHIN HONG KONG

3.1 The Chinese population of Hong Kong has a deep-rooted mistrust of the Government of the People's Republic of China. As Sir David Wilson told us "it has only been quite recently that 50 per cent of the population of Hong Kong have actually been born in Hong Kong"." Of the total population of Hong Kong, some 5.6 million, 43 per cent, were born since 1962. Many of those who came into Hong Kong from mainland China were either fleeing civil war or persecution, or seeking a stable environment in which to make a living. It is therefore not surprising that, at the heart of the anxieties over the transfer of sovereignty in 1997, lies the fear of Chinese interference in, or even control of, Hong Kong. The abiding impression we received from our discussions in Hong Kong was that views on the development of representa- tive government, on human rights and so on were determined principally by what was thought to constitute the best guarantee against Chinese interference in Hong Kong.

3.2. When we were in Hong Kong the arguments we heard from both "liberal" and "con- servative" camps were intended to establish, as it were, a ring fence around Hong Kong; the phrases used were, "government of Hong Kong by Hong Kong people", "one country, two systems", "a high degree of autonomy”. The aim was to insulate Hong Kong as far as possible

'Q 881.

2 Q 883.

3 See also paragraph 4.32.

4 Q 556.

Q 563. 'Q 118.