CONFIDENTIAL
Background
3.
The PUS has already had an opportunity to ask Mr Howell about
A these two points. I attach Mr Adams' minute of 27 April. From
this it is clear that the referendum point is without foundation.
But Mr Howell is evidently inclined to take the Chinese remarks on
nationality at face value.
Referendum
E U
B 4. I attach Peking telno 695 (the Embassy's record of Mr Howell's
C final press conference in Peking), Hong Kong telno 1320 (containing
D the Governor's comments) and Peking telno 725 (containing those of
Sir A Donald). The Embassy's record of the press conference does
indeed suggest that Mr Howell told the press that the Chinese gave
the Committee a very positive response of a referendum before 1997.
I have however spoken to Miss Bailes on the telephone about this:
her explanation is that Mr Howell had either misunderstood the
question or was replying to another question not reflected in the
Embassy's record. In any event, there can be no doubt that the
whole affair is a canard. No follow up action with the Chinese would therefore be necessary.
Nationality
E 5.
F
I attach Peking telno 700, reporting the Embassy's account of the Committee's call on Zhou Nan. Paragraph 8 records that Zhou Nan took the line that the nationality issue was "the UK's
internal affair". I attach Peking telno 729, which contains Sir A Donald's assessment of the Chinese position and in particular on what China's reaction would be to an extension of the right of
abode in the UK to a limited number of Hong Kong BDTCs.
6.
It is evident from these references that the Chinese were
careful to avoid commenting directly on the nationality issue. This is not entirely surprising, given that the exchange of
memoranda associated with the Joint Declaration constitutes an
CONFIDENTIAL
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