TNAG-1846-FCO40-2621-House-of-Commons-Select-Committee-on-Foreign-Affairs-enquiry-1989 — Page 102

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removing the Chief Executive did not appear to have been

satisfactorily resolved in the Basic Law. Some mechanism was

required which would enable the Legislative Council swiftly to

remove the Chief Executive if he failed to command their support.

the

3. On the powers of the Chief Executive and the HKSAR, Mr McLaren

explained that the aim of the Joint Declaration had been to preserve

the key features of the system of Government in Hong Kong as it

worked in practice; that was why we had negotiated arrangements which

would give the HKSAR Government maximum autonomy and limit to the

greatest extent possible those areas where the CPG would have

control. The Basic Law set out the areas where the HKSAR would

have autonomy in much greater detail than had been done in the

Letters Patent. Mr Fifoot pointed out that whereas Letters Patent

provided that the Governor must exercise his functions subject to the instructions of the Secretary of State, there was no equivalent

provision in the Basic Law that the Chief Executive must comply with

the instructions of the CPG. Under Article 48(8) the Chief

Executive was required to implement directives issued by the CPG

but, unlike the first draft, the second draft of the Basic Law made

no provision for the CPG to issue specific directives to the Chief

Executive. This provision might therefore be an anomaly in the

present draft.

4.

As for the removal of the Chief Executive, Mr Fifoot pointed out

that Article 72(9) of the Basic Law contained an impeachment

provision, although this provision was admittedly difficult to

operate and the last word rested with the CPG. It would therefore

be up to the State Council to decide whether to remove the Chief

Executive. However, there was also a device whereby the Legislative Council could force the Chief Executive to resign by preventing him from passing an appropriation bill. Legco would then be disolved under Article 50. If the reconstituted Legco again refused to pass the bill, the Chief Executive would have to resign under Article

52(2). Coincidentally, this process of dissolution and resignation could have the effect of advancing the timing of referenda to be

held on the question of direct elections for Legco and the Chief Executive by ending their terms prematurely.

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