CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL
iv)
the overheated reaction which there would be to the enquiry in Hong Kong, in particular if there was any question of taking evidence in the
territory.
The Committee would be overwhelmed by
lobbyists, not necessarily representative.
4. I drew the conclusion that the Committee might find it very
difficult to conduct a meaningful enquiry. We would be ready to give all the assistance we could to the Committee by way of confidential briefing. But it was hard to see how in these circumstances the Committee would be able to produce a balanced
report.
5. Mr Howell acknowledged the sensitivities in China and Hong Kong. But he made it clear that his Committee was determined to tackle Hong Kong: after all HMG had undertaken to keep Parliament informed of progress and they were only taking HMG at their word. But he fully accepted that the Committee should take the Joint Declaration as its starting point: for the terms of reference he had in mind something like, "To study progress towards implementation of the Joint Declaration". He did not envisage an Mr Howell also enquiry in the most open-ended sense of the word. drew a helpful distinction between matters on which we were formally involved in the negotiation with the Chinese in the JLG, and those where we had no formal locus and our influence had to be exercised very discreetly. I rubbed in the point by saying that most of the really interesting issues inevitably fell into the second category.
6.
My impression is that we have effectively no prospect of avoiding an enquiry into Hong Kong. Mr Howell himself may well have misgivings, but the pressures on him from the Committee are strong. He seems fairly sensitive to the potential pitfalls, not least the prospect of over-exposure in Hong Kong. I think he will try to be as helpful as his Committee lets him.
CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL
17.
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