TNAG-1803-FCO40-2563-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-talks-between-the-UK--Hong-Kon-1988 — Page 3

-mage. Our view has been that there can be no comprehensive solution agreed between the two sides which does not make provision for the return of all those VBP in Hong Kong who are denied refugee status.

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There would seen to be some room for manoeuvre on this point, in that the immediate priority will be to make early progress with the repatriation of the over 250 volunteers who have emerged recently. We hope to be in a position to hand over a list of at least 100 names to the Vietnamese during the second round of talks and early action on their part to return these people will be a priority. By establishing efficient arrangements for the repatriation of the volunteers we hope to encourage others to come forward. However we do not expect

do not expect large numbers to do so until the results of screening start to become available. We judge that large scale voluntary repatriation will not occur until there is a general acceptance by the detainees that there is no route to resettlement from Hong Kong

from Hong Kong available

available to them, and thus the sole remaining alternative of repatriation becomes a reality.

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We think that it would be unwise to press the Vietnamese too hard to accept explicitly the principle of involuntary repatriation. Instead, we think that our tactics at the second round should be first, to agree the immediate return of the present volunteers; and, second, to help the Vietnamese to blur the distinction between voluntary and involuntary repatriation so that they can accept the idea of a comprehensive solution involving the return of all those determined not to be refugees. We will argue that early action on the return of volunteers will assist greatly in making further progress and that people wishing to

to return to their own country should have a right to do so.

Objectives for the Second Round

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Although we hope to build on

to build on the progress made in first round, it would be unrealistic to expect a comprehensive agreement to emerge at the October meetings. We see Our objectives as being both immediate and longer term. Our immediate objectives will be to -

(a)

persuade the Vietnamese to accept as many as possible of the volunteers for early repatriation. We would argue that in the context of the relatively small numbers involved the question of reintegration assistance does not arise.

CONFIDENTIAL