CONFIDENTIAL
the problem.
4.
Dr Barber referred to reports that the Khmer Rouge had plans to exterminate their political opponents in the event of their regaining power in Cambodia. They had not mended their ways. Once the Vietnamese left Cambodia, there would be nothing to stop them coming to power. Was there any way in which the increase in the strength of the Khmer Rouge could be arrested?
5.
In response, the Secretary of State said that the Government were deeply concerned about the present refugee situation in Hong Kong. His forthcoming visit, when the subject would feature prominently, would enable him to assess the situation at first hand and to consider with the HKG and with colleagues what new measures, if any, would be desirable. We would also keep in close touch with UNHCR. It was clear that conditions in Vietnam were generating the continuing outflow of people. We would continue to explore a means of finding a durable solution to the problem. We were pursuing this through all available channels, including the Soviet Union. As regards aid to Vietnam, he said that there were no plans to change the present policy. On screening, he observed in response to the BRC's comments, that an inevitable consequence of screening was that those screened out would have no hope of resettlement: otherwise such a policy would have no deterrent effect. On Cambodia we were not as gloomy about the prospects as the BRC.
6.
Lord Chitnis expressed thanks and said he hoped that there would be opportunities for the BRC to keep in regular touch as the situation developed.
7.
The meeting ended at 4.45pm.
Hong Kong Department May 1988
CC: Private Secretary
PS/Lord Glenarthur
PS/Mr Eggar
Mrs Bottomley
Mr Gillmore
Mr McLaren
SEAD
UND
CONFIDENTIAL
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