TNAG-1801-FCO40-2561-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-resettlement-in-the-UK-1988 — Page 67

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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be drawn from UK refusal cases, long stayers and refugees selected for their skills; and (c) some new arrangement involving sponsorship by individuals/organisations (likely to involve very small numbers).

4.

Mr Renton said that he had considerable sympathy for these arguments: he well remembered making a broadly similar appeal as an FCO Minister to Mr Waddington a year before. The general climate for refugee resettlement was now even more difficult, with greatly increased pressure from refugees from elsewhere and widespread abuse of asylum procedures. Mr Flesher noted that the quality of refugees was also a factor: the North Vietnamese peasants now fleeing to improve their lot were not of great interest to resettlement countries. the "bottomless pit" argument was also a major problem. It Britain took 9,000 refugees how were we to prevent the flow from Vietnam to Hong Kony that would merely substitute another 9,000?

Mr Flesher added that

5. Mr Renton accepted that the Hong Kong figures were not large. But he wondered whether it would be possible to argue that any increase acceptable in British political terms would have an effect on the other resettlement countries. Lord Glenarthur said that this was difficult to predict. The larger our commitment, the greater its likely impact abroad. We would have given a signal to others. You noted that Mr Renton had rightly argued a year previously that to reduce our commitment would have a negative effect. The Americans in particular could do more, but said they would only consider doing so if HMG increased its commitment. We had focussed on 30 a month as the most reasonable balance.

6.

Mr Renton said that the Home Office had produced some ideas on taking up the shortfall in the 468. Lord Glenarthur said that this was welcome. But it was frankly not enough. He asked for comments on repeated claims by the voluntary agencies that they could handle 40 refugees a month, whereas the Home Office insisted on a maximum of 20.

Ms Dale said that the agencies probably could do more

But after in terms of the initial reception of refugees. 3-4 months these refugees moved on, and were then looking to the public sector for housing. This already created difficulties with 20 a month. She also commented that up to 80% of the Vietnamese refugees already in Britain were unemployed.

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/7. Lord

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