TNAG-1800-FCO40-2560-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-principle-of-first-asylum-1988 — Page 271

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NOTE FOR THE FILE

HUMANITARIAN LIAISON WORKING GROUP (HLWG): BRIEFING BY

MR A E DEWEY, DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, ON 25 MARCH 1988: THAILAND

1. On 25 March Mr Dewey briefed HLWG Permanent Representatives on the latest developments of the refugee situation in Thailand and on the recent mission of Mr Homann-Herimberg, the Head of the Regional Bureau for Asia and Oceania, to the area.

Situation in East Thailand

2. Mr Dewey referred to the briefing that Mr Bayandor of the Regional Bureau had given to HLWG on 2 March and stated that the question of the "push-offs" of Vietnamese boat people in East Thailand was one of the most difficult protection problems that UNHCR were facing. Although there were now fewer arrivals on the East Coast, there was no improvement in the protection situation. UNHCR had received no assurances from the Royal Thai Government (RTG) that their pre-January 1988 policy of first asylum had been restored or that the authorities in the East had been informed of the restoration of the policy. UNHCR therefore concluded that the push-offs were being allowed (or even directed) to happen.

3. UNHCR had also had no assurance from the RTG that the practice of push-offs had been revoked. This meant that UNHCR's protection mandate was now being hindered by the practice and policy of the RTG. Access by UNHCR to the refugees on the islands was being denied by the government so that UNHCR were not even able to establish the names of those refugees or where they had come from.

4. This was all causing a growing sense of frustration within UNHCR and within the NGO community that the diplomatic efforts made so far were not going to change RTG policy: UNHCR therefore considered that a more drastic and audible approach needed to be adopted. In addition to which, UNHCR considered that the RTG perception was that the international community understood their problem and, far from condemning the situation, was condoning it through its silence. Mr Dewey therefore called for immediate moral support from HLWG governments: this should, however, not be in the form of confrontation as the High Commissioner did not at present wish to go public on the

issue.

5. In late February the RTG had signalled their intention to negotiate with UNHCR a solution, based on Thai national interests and recognised humanitarian norms. The Thai National Security Council were to conduct these negotiations and had said that the RTG were prepared:

(a) to restore UNHCR access to the beach shelters;

(b)

to permit immediate humanitarian assistance to those on the islands; and

(c) to regroup and transfer those persons to the mainland.

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/UNHCR