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their announcement of the complete withdrawal of troops by 1990. This was a promise to the people of Cambodia and Vietnam. Similarly, they argued that the question of direct talks between the Khmer factions and Vietnam was no longer a live issue: JIM had settled that. They identified the main problem as "dismantling" the Khmer Rouge. I asked Deputy Foreign Minister Nien whether Vietnam accepted that a new coalition government in Phnom Penh should include the four factions. He replied that it was an internal matter but he expected all four factions (ie including the Khmer Rouge) to be represented. He added that Prince Sihanouk did not have much time and his military forces were not strong. He ought therefore to come to an agreement with Hun Sen soon. Although the Khmer Rouge would still be able to disturb the security situation in Cambodia, particularly in the West, "they are fish without water", to paraphrase Mao.
14.
The Vietnamese line on troop withdrawals was consistent and clear. Vietnam will withdraw all their forces by the end of 1990, come what may. The troops will be pulled out in advance of that date in the event of a political settlement. The reference to withdrawal by 1989 was not a modification of this position but one of the points in the Hun Sen proposals put to the JIM which envisaged a political settlement in 1989.
15.
I said that we would judge Vietnam by deeds, not words. We did not regard ourselves as a major player in the Cambodia game although we were ready to help at a later stage if that was the general wish, for example in relation to reconvening the 1954 Geneva Conference or in the UN Security Council. We were opposed to the return to power of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge by force. Deputy Foreign Minister Nien said that the UK had been too inactive generally in the region. One official (Phuong) argued that the fact that we were not directly involved in Cambodia qualified us to play a particularly useful role. However, there was some complaint about Mrs Thatcher's recent remarks in Singapore when she called for a peace-keeping force in Cambodia when Sihanouk himself no longer wanted one. (We were unsighted on this). I asked the Head of Asia II Department, MFA (Tran Xuan Man) what he expected to emerge from the forthcoming meeting between the USSR and China on Cambodia. He replied that the time was past when big powers could settle matters over the heads of the small countries, implying that Vietnam would remain an arbiter of any settlement. I also asked Man what would happen to the troops withdrawn from Cambodia. He replied that they would be demobilised as part of a general reduction in the size of the PAVN. Both he and Nien thought that the NAM could play a useful role, the latter specifically referring to India.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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