TNAG-1796-FCO40-2556-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-repatriation--including-Opera-1988 — Page 86

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Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: D H Gillmore

W37 270 2156

(7742)

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26 August 1988

PS/Lord Glenarthur

PS/Mr Patten

PS/Mr Eggar

PS/PUS

Mr Fifoot, Legal Advisers

Mr McLaren o r

Mr Colvin, SEAD Mr Williams, UND

Mr Graham-Harrison, ODA

[VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE IN HONG KONG: DISCUSSIONS WITH THE VIETNAMESE ]

1. I have discussed this submission in earlier drafts with the Departments involved. I think it is right now to seek the Secretary of State's endorsement of the recommendations (with which I concur). The most tricky of these is the issue of reintegration assistance. The Secretary of State, in earlier discussions of the refugee problem, has said he would not rule out assistance of this kind. But it is clearly pretty unpalatable; opponents of forcible repatriation will make every effort to portray it as "blood" money and there will be strong public criticism from the usual quarters. Nonetheless, I am persuaded that this is now the only realistic option, provided we get in exchange clear guarantees from the Vietnamese about their treatment of the returnees and provided that suitable arrangements are made with UNHCR, both as a channel for funds and as a supervisor of the programme. It is only right, too, to warn Ministers that we may face ugly scenes on dockside or tarmac in Hong Kong as Vietnamese are loaded on to transport against their will.

2. Since the submission was drafted we have learned more of Malaysia's intentions. Kuala Lumpur telno 445 reports on Malaysian objectives at their forthcoming bilateral talks with Hanoi. These look pretty dramatic and should perhaps be taken with a pinch of salt. But even if the Malaysians are only half-way successful in their demands of the Vietnamese there is likely to be criticism in Hong Kong if HMG/HKG is thought to be doing less well. The Malaysian approach reinforces my view that we have now to bite the bullet and accept that, without an offer of repatriation assistance, we shall not achieve Vietnamese cooperation, and most certainly not in the short term.

3.

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Meanwhile it seems eminently sensible to press ahead as far possible with offorts to repatriate the volunteers (now said to number 103). The deterrent effect in Viet Nam and the perception in Hong Kong that something is being done would be helpful. I have already stressed the need for early action on this to the Vietnamese Ambassador in Bangkok, who is also an Assistant Foreign

intrin Minister, when he called on me on 22 August (FCO telno 187)

assister?

CONFIDENTIAL

/4.