TNAG-1795-FCO40-2555-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-repatriation--including-Opera-1988 — Page 32

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FM FCO

TO DESKBY 16010OZ HONG KONG

TELNO 2096

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RECEIVE

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CGISTRY

16 AUG 1988

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Tome

EGISTRY

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Action 163653

MDHOAN 2383

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FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR ACTING GOVERNOR FROM HUM, HKD

MIPT: VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE: THE WAY FORWARD

1.

MIPT REFERS IN PARA 3(C) TO THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIMENSION. THIS IS WELL KNOWN TO SIR D WILSON, AND I SHALL REMIND HIM OF THE BACKGROUND WHEN I SEE HIM ON 18 AUGUST. BUT YOU MAY WISH TO HAVE THE FOLLOWING EXPLANATION IN THE BACK OF YOUR MIND DURING TOMORROW'S EXCO DISCUSSION.

2.

OUR POLICY OF REFUSING ALL AID TO VIETNAM UNTIL VIETNAMESE TROOPS HAVE LEFT CAMBODIA IS ONE WITH WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY CLOSELY ASSOCIATED, AND WHICH OVER THE YEARS SINCE 1979, SHE HAS EXPRESSED IN PARTICULARLY CLEAR TERMS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AUTHORISED US TO INITIATE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE VIETNAMESE ON THE BASIS THAT WE WOULD NOT RULE OUT THE PROVISION OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE REINTEGRATION OF RETURNEES BUT IT WOULD BE MOST UNWISE FOR US TO GO ANY FURTHER DOWN THIS PATH UNTIL WE HAVE EXPRESS AUTHORISATION FROM NUMBER 10. (BY THE SAME TOKEN WE FELT IT WOULD BE UNWISE, IN BRIEFING OTHER GOVERNMENTS ON THE FIRST ROUND OF TALKS, EVEN TO OPEN UP CONSIDERATION OF THIS ISSUE UNTIL WE WERE SURE OF OUR GROUND.)

"

3. ANOTHER DOMESTIC POLITICAL ANGLE TO WATCH IS THE POSSIBLE ANALOGY WITH THE FATE OF THE COSSACKS. YOU MAY RECALL THE FURORE CAUSED HERE A FEW YEARS AGO BY THE REVELATION THAT AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, ON THE ADVICE OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE, HAD RETURNED COSSACK PRISONERS TO THE SOVIET UNION AGAINST THEIR WILL AND THAT THEY HAD SUBSEQUENTLY SUFFERED CRUELLY AT THE HANDS OF STALIN'S GOVERNMENT. THIS REMAINS A VERY EMOTIVE SUBJECT. WE ARE BOUND TO FACE THE CRITICISM THAT WE ARE TREATING THE VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE IN A SIMILAR FASHION. THIS WOULD BE INTENSIFIED IF THE GUARANTEES ON THEIR TREATMENT RECEIVED FROM VIETNAM WERE REGARDED AS INADEQUATE OR IF THE RETURNING BOAT PEOPLE ACTIVELY RESISTED REPATRIATION. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT MINISTERS SHOULD FEEL THAT THESE POTENTIAL DOMESTIC PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN FULLY EXPLAINED TO THEM, TOGETHER WITH OUR IDEAS ON HOW THEY CAN BE MINIMISED.

4.

NONE OF THE ABOVE AMOUNTS TO A REASON FOR SHELVING A POLICY

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