CONFIDENTIAL
3.
v)
given that few of the 43 members of EXCOM are sympathetic towards Vietnam. However, the text would have to be
fairly bland and should avoid pointing the finger directly at Vietnam. This proposal might have the additional advantage of pressing UNHCR to co-operate with Hong Kong's new policy (assuming they continue their reluctance to do so).
Reference to refugees in in the Secretary of State's speech to UNGA. I understand that this year's speech will not be a tour d'horizon. Depending on the theme proposed by the Planners, we might fit in a general passage on refugees and make a particular reference to Vietnam's performance on boatpeople.
The ideas at ii, iv and v are probably worth pursuing further. They would have the advantage of maintaining pressure on Vietnam (and UNHCR), gathering support for Hong Kong's policy on boatpeople and demonstrating to Hong Kong our willingness to tackle the issue on an international level. The promotion of such initiatives would fit in with the ideas in Mr Colvin's minute of 4 July which suggested that we should consider playing a more forward and constructive role and specified that "we could promote appropriate language in communiques and joint statements from major international meetings." The drawbacks would be that we could expose ourselves to criticism of focussing too much on Hong Kong, failing to offer a new commitment to the resettlement of Vietnamese in the UK and being reluctant to offer development aid to Cambodia or Vietnam.
4.
Much will depend on the outcome of the forthcoming talks in Hanoi, but it would be worth discussing this in due course with other interested departments. If we decide to proceed, early consultations would be essential, first with UKMis
New York and UKMis Geneva and then with sympathetic governments, particularly the ASEANS, EC, Americans and Australians.
20 July 1988
N60AIG
Peter Millett
CONFIDENTIAL
PJ MILLETT
UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.