CONFIDENTIAL
7.
15. The Secretary of State had said he at been struck by Peres' forlorn posture in Brussels 2 weeks ago. He was not optimistic about the outcome of elections in Israel. If Shamir were to achieve a real majority, this would be a prescription for an explosion. He asked Shultz if there were anything more that we could do in the circumstances ?
16.
Shultz said that his mind was still on the Moscow trip and he had not really focussed on what he should do during his forthcoming trip to the Middle East. It was certainly right that he should confront the Israelis with the realities but he needed also to demonstrate that the peace process existed. President Assad was absolutely no help. King Hussein wanted to help but was not able to do more: his main concern was that Shultz should pressure Shamir. Egypt on the other hand had been wonderfully helpful throughout. would fly to Jordan on 4 June, to Israel on 5 June, to Syria on 6 June and then hold talks in Madrid on 7 June. He could not
He
anticipate the outcome of the Arab Summit. He had it on good authority that the Algerians did not want Shultz to wind up the peace process. The Arabs could not endorse the peace process but did not want to destroy what was there. All in all, he was not looking forward to his forthcoming Middle East round. The Secretary of State commiserated.
EASTERN EUROPE
17. The Secretary of State spoke of the ferment in Eastern Europe. Shultz said that the Russians had not wanted to talk about Eastern Europe: their interest was Western Europe.
BERLIN AIR SERVICES
18.
The Secretary of State recalled that UK-French proposals were on the table for sharing the Berlin routes: yet we were now faced with a US deadline of 9 June to agree a provisional US proposal envisaging a 30% increase in traffic on a route growing at only 2% a year. He pressed the US side to withdraw their deadline. Ms Ridgway foresaw a tremendous fight on this. The US had accepted an earlier British request for provisional arrangements. When they came to seek a return of the favour, they were "being stiffed". 5,000 Pan Am passengers were currently waiting to know whether or not they would be able to fly to Berlin. The Secretary of State said there was no comparison between the 2 cases. The UK had sought US agreement to a "mini arrangement". What the US was now seeking was agreement to a huge change. There was a difference in scale. Time was needed to sort out the issue and he hoped that the deadline would be withdrawn. 6 days notice was unreasonable. He proposed (with no dissent from the US side) that Messrs Braithwaite and Wallis should try to find a way forward when they met on 4 June in Toronto. Ambassador Price recalled that there was also a significant UK-US problem over charges at Heathrow.
CONFIDENTIAL
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.