CONFIDENTIAL
5.
CAMBODIA/VIETNAM
9. Shultz had tried over the years to demonstrate to Shevardnadze that it was in the Soviet self-interest to address the problem of Cambodia. The Soviet Union was experiencing the "limits of power" in Cambodia (and Ethiopia). On Vietnam/Cambodia, the pressure of diplomacy and economic isolation was working. The Soviet Union however would tread gently because it did not want to jeopardise its large naval base in Vietnam. After a visit to Bangkok and Hanoi, during which he was able to make the obvious comparisons, Shevardnadze now had a more realistic approach. The problem was the slow learning curve of the Vietnamese. The best way forward was pursuing the formula from the UN Security Council, embracing withdrawal of foreign forces and international guarantees. Applied to Cambodia, it would involve troop withdrawals and an attempt to rally a government around Prince Sihanouk. The international guarantees were very difficult, and the US had to be cautious about who was asked to guarantee what. He thought there was "room for manoeuvre" with the Soviet Union over Cambodia.
SOUTHERN AFRICA
10. There was also prospect of movement on Angola. However, the question of venue for the talks had to be sorted out. London was fine. If there were pressure for meetings elsewhere, these should be in Africa. The Angolans and Cubans thought that, if talks took place in Paris, they would find some sympathy from the French government, which would be helpful to them. Mr Redman reported that Mr Pik Botha was quoted as saying that, if the talks were not held in Africa, they should not be held at all. The Secretary of State asked whether the Americans saw Savimbi as an obstacle. Shultz thought that Savimbi was the key. Meetings were taking place secretly. The Americans and others had been working hard to promote contacts via Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire and these had borne some fruit. Shevardnadze agreed the approach but seemed to have difficulty in pushing things forward within the Soviet system. A solution could not be rushed. Even a 10-year deadline was "a useful play". Moreover, the reconstruction of Angola after any settlement would have wide implications. It was a very rich country, currently "in a hole". Economically, it could spring back rapidly. The Benguela Railroad was a potentially important lateral link; such an alternative transportation system could place real pressure on South Africa. The Secretary of State and Shultz agreed on the need to keep up pressure.
11. The Secretary of State said that the whole situation could be overturned if South Africa did something unwise. We must keep up pressure on South Africa to pursue the right policies and eg avoid incidents like the Sharpville Six. The result of the French election could be to tilt France towards a pro-sanctions policy. Every such tilt towards sanctions exacerbated the problems in South Africa. Yet in this country there were indications of change as eg
CONFIDENTIAL
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