TNAG-1793-FCO40-2553-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-repatriation--including-Opera-1988 — Page 19

New measures of humane deterrence need to be carefully considered reduce

from Vietnam of the clandestine departure

those who

not would considered refugees by international standards.

to

be

First, the establishment of screening programs to determine which asylum seekers are bona fide refugees. These should come under appropriate international safeguards, including UNHCR monitoring. They could entail the opening of decent long-term holding

long-term holding facilities

facilities under UNHCR supervision for essential those determined to be ineligible for resettlement. It would be that all asylum seekers be permitted to land safely and to be put in contact with UNHCR for protection and assistance in entering the screening program.

Second, the temporary suspension of resettlement for new arrivals. This could be in effect at least until adequate screening and holding facilities are in place. It might also involve a uniform, minimum waiting period before new arrivals would be eligible for resettlement screening.

Third, the assurance that persons granted first asylum would enjoy no greater resettlement advantage than those seeking resettlement through the established orderly departure program. For the United States, this might mean limiting the possibility of resettlement among first asylum populations to categories P-1 through P-3, immigrants, and those of special interest to U.S., such as Amerasians and former reeducation camp inmates.

measures,

the

deterrent

effect

of rights of

In considering all these restricted resettlement has to be balanced against protecting the genuine refugees and the prospect of creating a buildup of a longstaying refugee

population. Since their objective is to restore first asylum, deterrent actions that

deny it,

such as

redirection, cannot be condoned or accepted.

Although

we

recognize

pushbacks, interdiction

and

that third

is not resettlement

the country

to once seemed panacea that it may have

be and can only be pursued under various constraints, it is still an essential component of any strategy, and the U.S. will continue to admit high levels of Indochinese and continue to urge other nations to do so. In this fiscal year we expect to admit 28,000 refugees from East Asia first asylum, even though the Thai have been reluctant to give us access for processing some categories of new arrivals because of their concerr about a magnet effect. In FY 1986 over 19,000 refugees left Thailand for resettlement in the United States, and in in FY 1987 over 20,000, and we hope that over 23,000 will leave Thailand for the United States this year. The budget restraints agreed to by the Administration and Congress will be squeezing us next year, but this is the current record.

A comprehensive approach for managing Southeast Asia's ongoing refugee problem must also include

This would an expanded Orderly Departure Program. require intensified efforts by the international community including the ASEAN countries to move Vietnam to increase the rate of departures under the existing orderly departure program and to extent the right of legal emigration to all who wish to leave, including former reeducation camp The inmates. The U.S. will continue actively to pursue these objectives.

coupled unilateral supervision of processing new applications for the ODP -- with a reduced number of departures caused fear and anxiety to thousands of Vietnamese who had been waiting for years to obtain permission to leave. lamentable situation combined with continued economic deprivation

contributed

This

and

to

the

desperate upsurge

same At the

cime, we

in persons are please.

political

persection attempting to leave Vietnam clandestinely. that at the UNHCR consultative meetings in Geneva last week, Vietnam committed itself to allow more and more of its citizens to leave Vietnam under for the United States and other resettlement countries.

the ODP