TNAG-1792-FCO40-2552-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-repatriation--including-Opera-1988 — Page 5

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entirely unexpected) that we have this difficulty in carrying UNHCR

with us, at least at the present initial stage. But I can see no

alternative to our authorising the Hong Kong Government to go ahead,

while explaining carefully to UNHCR why there really is no

alternative. This is the line advocated in the draft minute to

colleagues.

4.

I have discussed the substance of the UKMIS telegram with the

Secretary for Security in Hong Kong. His immediate reaction was

identical to mine. We can expect a telegram from Hong Kong tomorrow

morning confirming this position in strong terms. This will enable us to make any necessary addition to the draft minute before it

issues. It is important to keep to the timetable and get the minute

into the Prime Minister's weekend box.

5. The draft concentrates on our immediate objective of enabling the Hong Kong Government to go rapidly aheady with the introduction of its new policy. But it also puts down a clear marker, as I

believe it must, that the resettlement dimension will also have to

be addressed. As the draft points out we will face strong pressure

from Hong Kong and much more widely to make a further resettlement

offer, and strong criticism if we resist. If the Secretary of State is content, I propose to arrange a meeting with the Home Office early next week to consider the scope and composition of a future

resettlement commitment.

6. I attach the following papers as background to this submission:

B

(i) the Secretary of State's minute of 17 May to the Prime

Minister;

C

D

(ii) Mr Powell's letter of 18 May, containing the Prime Minister's

reaction;

(iii) my submission of 25 May, explaining the resettlement angle

more fully.

Crtan

CO Hum

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The