TNAG-1792-FCO40-2552-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-repatriation--including-Opera-1988 — Page 253

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CONFIDENTIAL

present ivew is that this would be necessary.

But he wishes to

make clear (and we acknowledge) that this will lessen the deterrent

effect.

In the light of these exchanges, we seem to be moving towards the conception of a policy which would contain the following

5.

elements:

(i)

(ii)

new Vietnamese arrivals in Hong Kong would no longer be automatically deemed to have refugee status;

a system of screening on arrival would be introduced to determine genuine refugees. This would be designed to ensure that no person in genuine fear of persecution on political, religious or other grounds would be repatriated;

(iii)

(iv)

those arrivals who were screened out would not be available for resettlement. They would be determined in closed camps, pending return to Vietnam at some future

date;

a major effort would need to be made to tackle the residual refugee population in Hong Kong (comprising those who had arrived prior to the introduction of the new policy, together with those new arrivals screened in as genuine refugees). The Hong Kong Government would no doubt seek substantial new resettlement commitments from the UK and other resettlement countries. They would

alsoy probably not be ready to contemplate absorption into Hong Kong society of any balance once they were satisfied that the problem was being reduced to manageable dimensions.

6. It is evident that the introduction of a policy on these lines would be controversial. To take our various constituencies in

turn:

(i) public reaction in Britain, as reflected in Parliament,

would be critical. But there would be a terrable defence

CONFIDENTIAL