TNAG-1791-FCO40-2551-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-repatriation--including-Opera-1988 — Page 103

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6.

7.

aim for such commitments to be met within, say, 1 year of arrival;

(iii)

to make the point that there are risks in the new

If the international community policy for Hong Kong. fails to persuade Vietnam to accept the return of those screened out within a reasonable time frame and if the screened out population became unmanageable it could become necessary to approach the international community

We would for assistance in sharing Hong Kong's burden. expect any such requests to be considered sympathetically. Refinements on the above could include

(a)

(b)

(c)

(a)

(e)

This would

If resettlement for the existing 10,000 Vietnamese boat people were agreed they could at an apropriate time be moved to open centres pending resettlement. save Hong Kong a substantial proportion of the HK$120 million now spent on closed centres, subject of course to the rate of new non-refugee arrivals.

New arrivals screened in could also be accommodated in open camps.

Provided that the Hong Kong Government's determination to repatriate those screned out was clear and credible a reasonable number of those screened out could be expected to submit themselves for voluntary repatriation before a programme for returning all those screened out is agreed. Training programmes for those screened out could be stepped up so as to enhance their worth to Vietnam on

return.

I am not Hong Kong

UNHCR's aid proposals are under consideration. sure how tempting they will prove to Vietnam. could consider whether there are other areas which might

(I understand be more tempting such as air services.

-

these were considered earlier and not followed up because of anticipated Chinese objections could be worth further thought), or increased trade opportunities.

The timing and presentation of introducing any new policy and of the possible refinements would have to be carefully considered so as not inadvertently to encourage new illegal departures from Vietnam. Hong Kong has suggested that any new initiative should only be introduced if the situation deteriorates further and if it Given the defacto position in is part of a new regional response. Thailand the willingness in ICG to contemplate tougher action, and the grim prospects for resettlement under existing circumstances, there is a strong argument for considering the early implementation of a new policy.

8.

In parallel we would need to continue and as appropriate to

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