TNAG-1790-FCO40-2550-Hong-Kong-Vietnamese-refugees-resettlement-in-third-countri-1988 — Page 6

RECORD OF DISCUSSIONS AT THE AUCWARTICES AMT, BONN, ON 16 DECEMBER 1988 BETWEEN MR MCLAREN AND DR KLAUS ZELLER, (AUS-EQUIVALENT FOR ASIA). CAMBODIA/VIETNAM

Present

Dr Zeller

Dr Ahrens, Head of South

East Asian and South Pacific Dept

Dr Dane Assistant

Mr McLaren

Mr Richards, Head, SAD

Mr Noble, British Embassy, Bonn

Dr Scheel Head, Far Eastern Dept

HMG

1. Mr McLaren described the continuing diplomatic activity to find a solution to the Cambodian conflict. All sides would have to make concessions. Sino-Soviet talks were making some progress; the Hun Sen-Sihanouk talks also;

talks also; JIM less so. China had influence over the Khmer Rouge (KR) but could probably not control them. was a minor player; Sihanouk's visit to London had been an attempt to boost his position. It was uncertain whether a reunited Cambodia with an acceptable Government and no Vietnamese troops was achievable. De facto partition was still a possibility. HMG was sceptical about

the Vietnamese commitment to withdraw their troops.

2.

Dr Ahrens agreed with this assessment. Egon Bahr (SPD Foreign Affairs spokesman) had recently seen Hun Sen. The latter had said that he was not opposed to a peace-keeping force of limited duration. Vietnamese withdrawal would be easier if the Hun Sen regime's troops were strong enough to stand up to KR. The KR had not changed essentially Pol Pot was still in charge. Elections would not be reliable: villagers would have to vote for whoever controlled their village. The danger of partition was real. The situation in Eastern Cambodia was completely unclear.

The elements of a

3. Dr Zeller shared Mr McLaren's frustration. solution existed but could not be assembled. The speed of progress in talks, even JIM, was nevertheless impressive. The Government in Hanoi was desperate to get out of Cambodia, preferably at low cost, but even without an agreement if that was necessary. If Vietnam ith withdrew we would have no further dispute/ Thailand and China would hoi. then be faced with the renewed chaos of KR. There was no reason to

be optimistic. The EC (except France) had little leverage.

A.

Mr McLaren briefed Dr Zeller on the views expressed by Sihanouk in London. Mr McLaren agreed that Vietnam's economic situation provided a reason to want to withdraw quickly but their strategic objectives in Indo-China argued in the opposite direction.

We were

A Zimbabwe-type

not confident, therefore, about claims of total withdrawal. Some Cambodian troops could be "reclothed" as Cambodians. solution was not a possibility in Cambodia. It would be impossible to provide a peace-keeping force large enough to police a settlement.

5.

Dr Ahrens was more optimistic about the Sino-Soviet talks but it was not clear that an agreement here would be acceptable to the West. We should make our views clear. One tool in our armoury was the promise of aid under acceptable circumstances. Mr McLaren agreed that a Sino/Soviet agreement would not necessarily suit the West.

But

/the