CONFIDENTIAL
6.
Church opinion became better educated in the realities of South Africa: this was beginning to diminish the ranks of the advocates of sanctions.
PHILIPPINES
12.
The Secretary of State said that, for all her posturing, Mrs Aquino wanted to see the US bases staying in the Philippines: the argument seemed to be more over money. Shultz agreed. However, he cautioned that it was dangerous for her to think that words did not matter in diplomacy. The danger was that, if Mrs Aquino drummed something up, she would not be able to control it. The Secretary of State said that Mr Manglapus had made a good impression at the EC-ASEAN meeting: he sounded like an articulate American! Shultz said that he was girding himself up for a real confrontation with Manglapus. His first question would be why was Manglapus against the Philippines ? The Secretary of State cautioned that the Philippines resented the term "mini Marshall" and preferred "polysectoral aid". The UK would certainly give support to the Philippines within the EC framework. It would be modest, but the psychological impact would be important.
MIDDLE EAST
13. On the Middle East generally, Shultz said the USSR were pursuing the usual tactic of using speeches in different places to suggest flexibility but then reneging when the US accosted them directly. However, he thought the Soviet Union was genuinely concerned about the situation in the Middle East. They wanted to be sure that they would be part of any peace process that showed any hope of success but the Soviet proposals themselves had no chance of working. Overall, the USSR was now more sophisticated about its Middle East policy.
14. The Soviet Union showed extreme sensitivity about the interplay of Middle Eastern diplomacy with the nationality issue and in particular their Muslim population. (Sometimes Shevardnadze was explicit in their private conversations!) On Iran-Iraq, we needed to keep pushing. Iran's position was changing. It had suffered setbacks in the Gulf and on the battlefield. It had been humiliated in its two confrontations with the US. Syria was giving it a lot of trouble in Lebanon. Iran probably saw itself as being squeezed out of the picture there. Apart from the tension between Iran and Syria, there was the problem of Iran's relations with Hizbullah. The latter saw Iran increasingly as a "potential drag" in Lebanon. Shultz's policy would be to keep the process in being, to keep pushing and to be willing to talk to Iran if they had anything sensible to say (the US continued to receive messages through emissaries).
CONFIDENTIAL
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